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Jorge L. Contreras1 
 




Generic terms – those that describe a general class of goods or 
services -- are not eligible for trademark protection. Firms have 
historically gone to great lengths to prevent their trademarks from 
becoming generic – a fate often referred to as genericide. But in a 
few rare cases, firms have voluntarily declared certain terms that 
they have created to be generic, a phenomenon that I refer to as 
“sui-genericide”. This article explores the little-discussed 
phenomenon of sui-genericide, both its origins in government-
sponsored programs of the mid-twentieth century and its most 
recent incarnation in the area of technical interoperability 
standards. Though the voluntary relinquishment of the exclusive 
rights conferred by patents and copyrights has been studied 
extensively in the literature, there has been comparatively little 
scholarly attention to such mechanisms under trademark law.  This 
article examines the potential effects of sui-genericide on producer 
incentives, follow-on innovation and consumer welfare and 
considers some of the ramifications of incorporating a sui-
genericide doctrine into the law. It concludes by recommending 
potential measures to enhance the legal recognition of declarations 
of sui-genericide. These include official consideration during 
trademark prosecution of “consensus” lists of common terms that 
are developed by broadly-representative industry groups and the 
creation of a presumption of genericness for terms that appear on 
such lists, together with international harmonization of this 
recognition.  
                                                 
1 J.D. (Harvard Law School), B.S.E.E., B.A. (Rice University). Professor of 
Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.  This research was made 
possible in part through generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard 
Fund for Faculty Excellence. The author thanks Filipe Acosta, Brad Biddle, Bob 
Brauneis, Maggie Chon, Christine Farley,  Katrina Hull, Yvette Liebesman, Jake 
Linford, Glynn Lunney, Guido Martinelli, Lisa Ramsey and Jeffrey Van Hoosear 
for their valuable feedback and comments on this paper. This paper has benefitted 
from feedback and discussion at the 2019 INTA Trademark Scholarship 
Symposium in Boston, Massachusetts, and the 7th Annual Trademark Works in 
Progress Colloquium at American University Washington College of Law (Sept. 
2018). Research assistance by Brian Flach and Luke Hanks is greatly appreciated. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043 







I.   Genericism and Genericide Today 
 
A.  Genericism Defined 
B. Challenging Marks as Generic 
C. Genericide Counter-Measures 
D. The Economics of Genericide 
 
II. The History of Sui-Genericide 
 
A. The Department of Commerce Generic Word Program – 
A Genericide Wish List 
B. Generic Drug Names 
C. Pesticide Common Names 
D. Synthetic Textile Fibers 
E. Recent Governmental Engagement with Sui-Genericide 
F. Technical Standards 
1. Trademarks and Technical Standards 
2. Standards and Certification 
3. Acts of Sui-Genericide: USB and W3C 
 
III. Understanding Sui-Genericide 
 
A. Market Rationales for Sui-Genericide 
B. Doctrinal Effects of Sui-Genericide 
C. Certification versus Genericide 
D. Sui-Genericide versus Nominative Fair Use 
 
IV. Legal Frameworks for Sui-Genericide 
 
A. Legal Effect of Unilateral Declarations 
B. Non-recognition of Sui-Genericide in Trademark 
Proceedings 
C. Reliance and Estoppel 
D. Cancelation Proceedings 
E. Toward Greater Legal Recognition of Sui-Genericide 
1. Consensus Lists in Trademark Examination 
2. A Presumption of Genericism 
3. Due Process in the Development of Consensus Lists 
4. Implementation: Legislation versus Regulation 
5. International Harmonization 
 
Conclusion  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043 







Intellectual property rights confer on their owners exclusive 
rights to exploit inventions, works of authorship and marks for 
specified periods of time.  These rights, particularly when held by 
business entities, are often viewed as valuable assets, and significant 
resources are devoted to obtaining, securing and enforcing them 
against others. Yet prominent examples exist in which holders of 
valuable intellectual property voluntarily relinquish some or all of 
their exclusive rights to the public.2 Such contributions may take the 
form of either outright gifts of the relevant IP rights to the public 
domain or of contractual or pseudo-contractual licenses or “pledges” 
by rights holders. 
 
For centuries, the author of a copyrighted work has been 
permitted to make of his composition a “gift to the public”.3 Today, 
more formal mechanisms exist for dedicating copyrighted works to 
the public, including a standardized online tool offered by the non-
profit Creative Commons.4 When a copyrighted work – a novel, a 
song, a photograph -- enters the public domain, it becomes free for 
all to use and modify without restriction.5  
 
In the case of patents, there are various mechanisms by which 
inventors may intentionally abandon or dedicate their inventions to 
the public. Firms may release information via publication in order 
to prevent it from becoming the subject of patents.6 And an applicant 
                                                 
2 The focus of this article is on the intentional relinquishment of IP rights.  It 
is also the case that IP rights may be forfeited through involuntary mechanisms, 
either through the neglect or inattention of the owner, or in response to challenges 
by third parties. The effect of extinguishing such rights is similar, whether caused 
by voluntary or involuntary means. 
3 Miller v. Taylor, [1769] 4 Burr 2303, 2345-46 (98 E.R. 201). But see Phillip 
Johnson, Dedicating Copyright to the Public Domain, 71 MODERN L. REV. 587, 
595 (2008) (questioning precedential authority of this case). 
4 Creative Commons, CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain 
Dedication (last visited Mar. 2, 2019), 
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ [hereinafter CC0 
Dedication]. 
5 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 892 (“When a copyrighted work – a 
novel, a song, a photograph -- is dedicated to the public domain by its owner, it 
becomes free for all to use and modify without restriction.”) 
6 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Patents, Policy and the 
Design of the Genome Commons, 12 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 61 (2011) 
(placement of genetic data into public domain by pharmaceutical industry to avoid 
patenting by others); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of 
Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1857 (2003) (“In growing numbers, 
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may deliberately abandon a patent application before it is fully 
prosecuted,7 after which the invention claimed in the application 
will become part of the public domain. Once abandoned, it cannot 
be patented by somebody else and will act as prior art defeating 
subsequent attempts to patent the disclosed invention and even new 
inventions that are obvious in view of that invention.8 The same is 
true when a patent expires, either at the end of its term or due to its 
owner’s failure to pay maintenance fees.9 The inventions claimed by 
an expired patent can never again by claimed by another: they are 
forever part of the public domain.   
 
Likewise, the phenomenon of pledging IP rights to the public 
has been observed and analyzed extensively in the literature.10  
Notable examples include, under copyright law, open source 
software licensing,11 the distribution of free content by online 
platforms,12 and the  dissemination of large amounts of user-
developed content under Creative Commons licenses,13 and, under 
patent law, the pledging of patents to promote new technology 
                                                 
firms elect to forego patent protection, and choose instead to publish potentially 
patentable research findings”). 
7 37 C.F.R. § 1.138(a) (“An application may be expressly abandoned by filing 
a written declaration of abandonment identifying the application in the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office.”)  Though under some circumstances, an 
inventor may revive a patent application after it has been abandoned.  35 U.S.C. 
27. 
8 See, e.g., Vass v. Multi Med Indus., 204 USPQ 1071, 1073 (E.D. N.Y. 1979) 
(“Reference in [patent] 575 to the abandoned application 106 disclosed the claims 
to the public and became part of the body of prior art.”). 
9  Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 550 U.S. 933 (2007) (“failure to pay required maintenance fees results in 
expiration of the patent, 35 U.S.C. § 41(b)”). See also 4 Chisum on Patents § 
11.02. 
10 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793 (2016); Jorge L. Contreras, Patent 
Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. UNIV. L.J. 543 (2015); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access Property, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 77 (2008); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in 
the Public Domain, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 183 (2004). 
11 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (discussing open 
source code); Merges, supra note 10, at 186 (discussing IBM’s Linux strategy). 
12 See Jonathan Barnett, The Costs of Free: Commodification, Bundling and 
Concentration, USC Gould Center for Law and Social Science Research Papers 
Series No CLASS17-9 (2017) (describing rise of free content on online 
platforms). 
13 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLORIDA L. REV. 
763 (2003). 
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platforms,14 interoperability standards,15 and social causes,16 and to 
preempt the appropriation of rights by others.17 When such pledges 
are legally enforceable and irrevocable, they act as partial 
relinquishments of rights to the public.18 
 
Trademarks, like other forms of intellectual property, can have 
substantial value.  As noted by Professor Barton Beebe, marks like 
APPLE, GOOGLE, SAMSUNG, TOYOTA, MCDONALDS, STARBUCKS, NIKE, 
COKE, and PEPSI are “instantly recognizable by a very large 
proportion of humanity, [and] are among the most valuable and 
influential signs in the world, rivalling in significance many 
religious and national symbols.”19  
 
Yet, with a few exceptions, little scholarly attention has been 
paid to expanding the public domain under trademark law. These 
exceptions include a strain of literature addressing the development 
of naming systems outside the boundaries of conventional 
trademark protection (e.g., the fanciful pseudonyms used by roller 
derby participants),20 and recent work by Professors Daniel Hemel 
and Lisa Ouellette that considers both doctrinal and technological 
measures that have the potential to expand the stockpile of words 
and symbols available for use in identifying goods and services – 
the “semantic commons”.21  And, of course, a host of scholars over 
the years have critiqued the breadth of various protective doctrines 
                                                 
14 See Chien, Levers, supra note 10; Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 
10. 
15 See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 10. 
16 See Jorge L Contreras, Bronwyn H Hall & Christian Helmers, Pledging 
Patents for the Public Good (assessment of prominent green technology pledge); 
Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 10 (identification of pledges made for 
philanthropic reasons). 
17 Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy, supra note 6, at x (placement of genetic data 
into public domain by pharmaceutical industry to avoid appropriation by 
biotechnology firms); Merges, supra note 10, at 186 (IBM’s Linux strategy as a 
response to Microsoft).  
18 See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND 
Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479, x (2015). 
19 BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN SOURCE CASEBOOK, Intro. 
at 2 (4th ed. 2017). 
20 See David Fagundes, Labor and/as Love: Roller Derby as Constructed 
Cultural Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS, Ch. 13 (Brett 
Frischmann, Michael Madison, Katherine Strandburg, eds., 2014). 
21 Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Governing the Semantic 
Commons (working draft May 26, 2018, on file with author) (defining “semantic 
commons” as “the supply of words, sounds, and symbols that can be readily used 
to describe tangible and intangible items—and, in particular, to describe products, 
services, and their sources”.) This effort responds in part to empirical work 
showing that the available store of common English words is running out. Barton 
Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical 
Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945 (2018).  
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under trademark law, arguing that they should be narrowed in one 
way or another.22 However, none of this work tackles head-on the 
question whether and how trademarks might be contributed by their 
owners to build a common pool of resources, nor whether such a 
commons is even desirable. 
 
One of the impediments to this line of reasoning may be inherent 
limitations imposed by trademark law itself. Unlike patent and 
copyright law, which offer mechanisms by which inventions and 
works of authorship may be dedicated to the public domain, 
trademark law offers no explicit mechanism by which mark owners 
may place a particular word, term or device into the public domain.  
 
Though a trademark application may expressly be abandoned by 
the applicant, the effect of abandonment is not the same as it is for a 
patent application. When a trademark application seeking protection 
for a mark is abandoned, the mark may become the subject of a new 
application by anyone else who wishes to use the mark. The same 
principle applies when a registered trademark is not renewed,23 a 
trademark is abandoned due to non-use24 or a registration is 
otherwise canceled.25 The expiration and cancelation of a mark do 
not prevent a subsequent claimant from appropriating the mark for 
itself. In fact, even while arguing for an explicit statutory regime to 
facilitate the dedication of patents and copyrights to the public 
domain, One scholar considers trademarks to be so different in kind 
from these other forms of IP that they are expressly excluded from 
his proposed statutory scheme to expand the public domain.26  
 
And trademarks may, indeed, be very different than patents and 
copyrights inasmuch as they bear even less resemblance to 
traditional forms of property than these other forms of intellectual 
property. Professor Adam Mossoff, in arguing that trademarks 
should be treated as use-based (usufructury) property rights, 
acknowledges the prevailing view that a trademark is considered “a 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First 
Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2005) (arguing for limitation of trademark 
rights to foster free speech); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 
EMORY L.J. 367, 391-410 (1999) (criticizing trademark protection for trade 
dress); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common 
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999) (critiquing as over-broad doctrines such 
as trademark dilution, trade dress protection, and anti-cybersquatting). 
23 cite 
24 See Lanham Act, § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be 
‘abandoned’ (a) when its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume…”) 
25 cite 
26 Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 799 
(2013) (“Waiving trademark rights is inadvisable since doing so may result in 
significant consumer confusion.”) 
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regulatory entitlement whose function is to increase social welfare 
by reducing consumer search costs”.27 If so, then it is easy to see 
why such an entitlement, when renounced by its “owner”, would not 
thereafter be made available to the general public any more than the 
social security check renounced by an individual recipient would be 
given to someone else requesting it. 
 
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner describe 
the potential effects of the differential treatment of abandonment 
observed between patents and copyrights, on one hand, and 
trademarks, on the other: “When property is abandoned, the law’s 
choice is between “depropertizing” it, so that anyone can use it but 
no one can establish an exclusive right to its use, and allowing it to 
be reappropriated, which may make for more efficient use but may 
also incite rent seeking by competing would-be reappropriators.”28 
As discussed above, the abandonment of patents and copyrights falls 
into the former category, while the abandonment of trademarks falls 
into the later.  Thus, there is no affirmative procedural mechanism 
that enables a trademark owner to contribute his or her mark to the 
public or to make it available for public use.  
 
This being said, marks can and do lose their protected status 
under one particular set of circumstances: when they are found to be 
generic. Generic terms – those which lack distinctiveness and 
describe a generic class of goods or services – cannot be enforced as 
trademarks or registered by others.29 A finding of genericness, 
however, cannot be initiated by a mark owner.  It results either from 
the action of the trademark examiner during the prosecution process 
or the challenge of a third party either in an opposition or 
cancellation proceeding or litigation.30 
 
This article, for the first time, identifies and describes the 
practice of “sui-genericide”,31 whereby a private actor declares that 
                                                 
27 Adam Mossoff, Trademark as a Property Right, 107 KY. L.J. __, 3 (2018). 
For critiques of Mossoff’s thesis, see, e.g., Bryan L. Frye, Metaphors on 
Trademark: A Response to Adam Mossoff, “Trademark as a Property Right”, 107 
KY. L. J. ONLINE (2018); Camilla Alexandra Hrdy, Adam Mossoff: Trademarks 
As Property, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION Blog (Sept. 5, 2017, 9:52 PM), 
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2017/09/adam-mossoff-trademarks-as-
property.html. 
28 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 28-29 (2003). 
29 See Part I, infra.  
30 See Part x, infra. 
31 The term “sui-genericide” is derived from “genericide”, a challenge to a 
trademark on the basis that it is generic (see note 55, infra), and “sui”, a prefix 
derived from the Latin term meaning “of oneself”. See Online Etymology 
Dictionary, suicide, https://www.etymonline.com/word/suicide (visited Apr. 27, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043 
CONTRERAS – SUI-GENERICIDE 
8 
 
a particular word or term is generic and thereby seeks to commit it 
to the public domain.  Far from the fringe of commercial activity, 
this practice has existed for decades in areas such as pharmaceutical 
and pesticide common names, and more recently has emerged with 
respect to the names of pervasive interoperability standards such as 
HTML, XML and USB that are embodied in billions of products 
around the world. 
 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews 
current U.S. law relating to trademark genericism, including its 
doctrinal and economic roots.32  Part II explores the phenomenon of 
sui-genericide – the intentional declaration that one’s own mark is 
generic – both in several historical contexts and more recently in the 
area of technical standards.  Part III explores the rationales and 
explanations for sui-genericide, and Part IV poses the question how, 
and whether, sui-genericide, can be facilitated through existing and 




I.   GENERICISM AND GENERICIDE TODAY 
 
A. Genericism Defined 
 
The degree of distinctiveness exhibited by a trademark affects 
both its eligibility for registration and its enforceability. 
Distinctiveness is generally classified into four categories 
enumerated by the Second Circuit in Abercrombie and Fitch Co. v. 
                                                 
2019). The term also alludes to the Latin term sui generis, used frequently 
discussions of intellectual property to denote a new form of protection beyond 
existing statutory or common law forms (e.g., whether software should be 
protected by copyright, patent or a sui generis form of protection).  See Sui 
Generis, The Law Dictionary, https://thelawdictionary.org/sui-generis/ (“of its 
own kind or class”). 
32 The focus of this article is on U.S. law.  However, the trademark-limiting 
effect of genericism has been recognized in other jurisdictions including the 
European Union, as well as under the Paris Convention.  See ECJ C-191/01, 
EUIPO v Wm Wrigley Jr Co; [2003] E.C.R. I-12447, para. 25 and 31 (exclusion 
of generic terms from trademark protection “serves the public interest of leaving 
terms free to be used by all traders and thereby prevents such terms from being 
reserved to one undertaking only”); Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, Art. 6.B (trademarks may not be denied registration or 
invalidated except when they are “devoid of any distinctive character, or consist 
exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the 
kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place of origin, of the goods, or 
the time of production, or have become customary in the current language or in 
the bona fide and established practices of the trade of the country where protection 
is claimed”).  
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Hunting World, Inc.33  Under the Abercrombie framework, marks 
that are either fanciful (invented terms such as EXXON, TYLENOL and 
PRIUS) or arbitrary (common words applied in an unfamiliar 
manner, such as PUMA used for sporting gear) are the strongest and 
are viewed as inherently distinctive.34 Marks that are suggestive 
(words that require “imagination, thought and perception to reach a 
conclusion as to the nature of goods”, such as “Microsoft” for 
computer software),35 are also distinctive.  However, words that are 
merely descriptive of the goods or services that they name, such as 
“App Store” for an online platform for distributing software 
applications, may not be registered without an additional showing 
of secondary meaning (i.e., that the mark has come to identify the 
source of the goods or services in the public eye).36 And, finally, 
terms that are generic, connoting a general category to which a 
particular product belongs (e.g., car, savings bank, lawnmower) but 
which give no specific indication of the product’s source, are viewed 
as not being distinctive and receive no trademark protection 
whatsoever.37 Though these rules may, at first glance, appear 
straightforward, the determination whether a particular term is 
generic or descriptive can be a difficult one.38  
 
As the Federal Circuit has explained, 
 
A generic mark, being the ultimate in 
descriptiveness, cannot acquire distinctiveness. This 
is so because generic terms are by definition 
incapable of indicating source, and therefore are the 
antithesis of trademarks, and can never attain 
trademark status.39 
 
A common test applied by the courts to determine whether a 
mark is generic is whether the “primary significance of the 
registered mark to the relevant public is as the name for a particular 
type of good or service irrespective of its source.”40 As further 
                                                 
33 537 F.2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1976). Other circuits have largely followed the 
Abercrombie framework. [cite McCarthy?] 
34 Id. at ¶12. 
35 Id. at ¶18. 
36 See id. at ¶6 and 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
37 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at ¶12.  See also 15 U.S.C. 1064(c) (a federal 
registration is subject to cancellation if at any time it "becomes the common 
descriptive name of an article or substance.") 
38 See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“Courts and commentators have recognized the difficulties of distinguishing 
between suggestive, descriptive, and generic marks.”) 
39 Royal Crown Co., Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co. *10 (Fed. Cir., Jun. 20, 2018). 
40 Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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explained by the Third Circuit in E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare 
Products, Inc., 
 
[T]he primary significance test … inquires whether 
the primary significance of a term in the minds of the 
consuming public is the product or the producer. We 
ask whether consumers think the term represents the 
generic name of the product [or service] or a mark 
indicating merely one source of that product [or 
service]. If the term refers to the product (i.e., the 
genus), the term is generic. If, on the other hand, it 
refers to one source or producer of that product, the 
term is not generic (i.e., it is descriptive, suggestive, 
or arbitrary or fanciful). To give an example, “Cola” 
is generic because it refers to a product, whereas 
“Pepsi Cola” is not generic because it refers to the 
producer.41 
 
Or, put more simply by the Ninth Circuit in Filipino Yellow 
Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publications, Inc.,42 a distinctive mark 
answers the questions ‘Who are you?’ ‘Where do you come from?’ 
‘Who vouches for you?’ But the [generic] name of the product 
answers the question ‘What are you?’”.43  
 
In addition, for a mark to be deemed generic, it must relate to 
the particular type of good or service for which the mark is 
registered. That is, even if a term has a generic meaning in some 
contexts, it may not be generic as to the particular good or service 
for which it acts as a mark.  As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Google, 
this requirement is necessary “to maintain the viability of arbitrary 
marks as a protectable trademark category”.44 That is, “[i]f there 
were no requirement that a claim of genericide relate to a particular 
type of good, then a mark like IVORY, which is arbitrary as applied 
to soap, could be cancelled outright because it is generic when used 
to describe a product made from the tusks of elephants.”45 
 
As a result, much depends on how an adjudicatory body 
interprets the relevant product or service genus to which the term is 
                                                 
41 538 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). See also 
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (genericness “refers, or has come to be understood as 
referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a species.”) 
42 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999). 
43 Id. (citing Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1323, 1324 
(9th Cir.1993)). 
44 Google, 860 F.3d at *9. 
45 Id. (citing Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 4, 9 n.6 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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applied.  In Google, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling 
that the term GOOGLE was not generic. It reasoned that even if a 
majority of the public uses the verb “google” indiscriminately to 
refer to Internet searching, this does not mean that GOOGLE has 
become a generic term for Internet search engines.46 
 
In In re Cordua Rests., Inc.,47 the Federal Circuit further 
complicated the analysis by holding that “a term can be generic for 
a genus of goods or services if the relevant public . . . understands 
the term to refer to a key aspect of that genus.”48 For example, “the 
term ‘pizzeria’ would be generic for restaurant services, even though 
the public does not understand the term to refer to the broad class of 
restaurants as a whole; the public need only understand that the term 
refers to ‘a particular sub-group or type of restaurant rather than to 
all restaurants.’”49 
 
Thus, in Royal Crown v. The Coca Cola Co., the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) upheld The Coca Cola Company’s 
registration of the mark ZERO to describe its line of no-calorie soft 
drinks.  Royal Crown brought an opposition challenging the mark, 
arguing, among other things, that the term ZERO was generic. In 
analyzing RC’s genericism challenge, the TTAB defined the 
relevant genus as “soft drinks, sports drinks, and energy drinks.”50  
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that “The 
[TTAB] failed to consider whether the relevant consuming public 
would consider the term ZERO to be generic for a subcategory of the 
claimed genus of beverages—i.e., the subcategory of the claimed 
beverages encompassing the specialty beverage categories of drinks 
with few or no calories or few or no carbohydrates.”51 
 
But even if certain terms are found to be generic, they may still 
form part of otherwise distinctive marks.  For example, the mark 
DYNAMITE for a take-out TexMex restaurant chain is likely arbitrary 
under the Abercrombie framework (given the lack of any actual 
connection between explosives and TexMex food). Yet the term 
BURRITO for a TexMex restaurant is almost certainly generic. Thus, 
to avoid any implication that the owner of  the DYNAMITE BURRITO 
                                                 
46 Id. at *20 (noting that the challenger failed to prove that “there is no way 
to describe ‘internet search engines’ without calling them “googles” and further 
observing that “not a single competitor calls its search engine “a google,” and … 
members of the consuming public recognize and refer to different “internet search 
engines”). 
47 823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
48 Id. at 603. 
49 Royal Crown, at *12-13 (quoting In re. Cordua, 823 F.3d at 605). 
50 Id. at *11. 
51 Id. at *13. 
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restaurant chain could claim rights in the word burrito itself, the 
PTO generally requires that generic terms included within registered 
marks be disclaimed as to standalone uses.52  Thus, the owner of 
DYNAMITE BURRITO would likely have an infringement claim against 
its competitor Dynamite Tacos, but not against Chihuahua Burrito.  
 
B. Challenging Marks as Generic 
 
A mark may be found to be generic in one of two principal ways: 
at the outset, when it is refused registration by the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO),53 or after registration, when a once-
distinctive mark is shown no longer to identify a source of goods 
and on that basis is canceled.54 This latter circumstance is sometimes 
referred to as “genericide”.55  There is a long list of U.S. trademarks 
that have been canceled due to genericide: ASPIRIN, BRASSIERE, E-
TICKET, ESCALATOR, LINOLEUM, THERMOS, TRAMPOLINE and ZIPPER, 
to name just a few.56  
                                                 
52 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., TRADEMARK MANUAL OF 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1213.03(c) (Oct. 2018) [hereinafter TMEP] (“If a mark 
is comprised in part of matter that, as applied to the goods or services, is generic 
or does not function as a mark, the matter must be disclaimed to permit 
registration…”); Royal Crown Co., Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co., slip op. at 3-4 
(Fed. Cir., Jun. 20, 2018) (discussing disclaimer of term “ZERO” in beverage 
companies’ diet soda marks). 
53 See, e.g., BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN SOURCE 
CASEBOOK, Part I, p. 45 (4th ed. 2017) (listing numerous examples and cases); 
LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 515 (5th ed., 2017)). 
54 Lanham Act, Sec. x. 
55 The term “genericide” was reportedly coined by the U.S. Trademark 
Association as a pejorative moniker designed to alert its members to the “danger” 
of genericism.  See Walter P. Margulies, How the F.T.C. Threatens Trademarks, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1979. See also GLYNN LUNNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TRADEMARK LAW 180 (2nd ed. 2015) (“Because of their antagonism towards the 
doctrine, trademark plaintiffs' attorneys … coined the term "genericide" to capture 
their sense that finding a trademark generic unfairly punishes successful 
trademark owners. By relabeling a court's decision that a term is or has become 
generic as genericide, the trademark bar attempted to link findings that a claimed 
trademark is generic with homicide or genocide, and other "-cides" that are 
inherently wrong.”) Despite its partisan origins, the term “genericide” has now 
entered the trademark lexicon and is used generally to mean the loss of trademark 
rights through a finding of genericism. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:1 (4th ed. 1998);  
Beebe, supra note 53, at 45, LOREN & MILLER, supra note 53, at 515; JEROME 
GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.02 (2017); 
Jacqueline Stern, Genericide: Cancellation of a Registered Trademark, 51 
FORDHAM L. REV. 666 (1983); Sung In, Death of a Trademark: Genericide in the 
Digital Age, 21 REV. LITIG. 159 (2002); John Dwight Ingram, The Genericide of 
Trademarks, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 154 (2004).  
56 See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 55, at x (listing numerous marks that have 
become generic); Ralph A. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic 
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The risk of genericide is highest for products that introduce a 
new technology to the marketplace, as consumers may quickly come 
to associate the product’s brand with its functionality and begin to 
use the brand to describe the general class of products to which it 
belongs.57  This risk is particularly pronounced for products that are 
patented, such that there is only one product/brand on the market 
during the period of patent exclusivity.58 This is the “trap” into 
which Bayer fell with respect to its patented painkiller “aspirin”.  As 
explained by Professor John Ingram, “during the life of the patent 
Bayer made no attempt to establish in the minds of the public some 
generic name for the product other than "aspirin." In fact, they 
welcomed the public acceptance and use of "aspirin" as the name of 
the drug. By the time the patent expired, it was too late. "Aspirin" 
was generic.”59 
 
A registered mark may be challenged as generic via one of four 
procedural routes:  
 
(1) The mark, once allowed by the PTO, will be 
published in the Official Gazette, following which 
any person “who believes that he or she would be 
damaged by the registration of [the] mark” may, 
within thirty days after publication, initiate an inter 
partes opposition proceeding at the Trademark Trial 
and Appeals Board (TTAB).60 At the opposition 
proceeding, any ground for rejection of the mark may 
be raised including that the mark lacks 
distinctiveness due to genericism.  
 
(2) Under Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, any 
person who believes that he or she would be 
                                                 
Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1324 (1980); Beebe, supra note 53, at 45; Loren & 
Miller, supra note 53, at 515. Though genericism is typically discussed in terms 
of trademarks for products and services, certification marks may also be subject 
to genericide. Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 
494, 497 (2d Cir. 1962) (“if an indication of regional origin, registered as a 
certification mark, becomes a generic term for a certain type of goods coming 
from any region, then the mark is subject to cancellation”). 
57 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An 
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 295 (1987) (“a difficult problem of 
determining whether a trademark has become a generic name arises in cases … in 
which the trademark owner initially has a product monopoly”). 
58 See Ingram, supra note 55, at 158-59. 
59 Id. 
60 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a); 37 C.F.R. 2.101-107. See also GRAEME B. 
DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 
AND POLICY (4th ed. 2014) (outlining opposition procedure). 
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damaged by the registration of a mark may petition 
to cancel a registration at any time “if the registered 
mark becomes the generic name for the goods or 
services”.61  
 
(3) In private litigation, one party, usually as a 
defense to an allegation of infringement, may 
counterclaim that an asserted mark is invalid as 
generic.62   
 
(4) A public agency such as the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) may petition the PTO to cancel a 
trademark as generic.63 
                                                 
61 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). 
62 McCarthy 
63 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (specifically authorizing FTC cancelation proceedings 
based on genericism). The history of the FTC’s exercise of its power under 
Section 14 of the Lanham Act is somewhat checkered. See, generally, John M. 
Fietkiewicz, Section 14 of the Lanham Act--FTC Authority to Challenge Generic 
Trademarks, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1980). Its first two petitions for 
cancelation of marks were rejected for lack of standing. FTC v. Elder Mfg. Co., 
84 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (Comm'r Pat. 1950); FTC v. Royal Mfg. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 429 (Comm'r Pat. 1950).  In 1958, 1960 and 1961, the FTC succeeded in 
canceling three registrations on the basis of abandonment and fraud. FTC v. 
Service Seed Co., Cancellation No. 7478 (T.T.A.B., filed May 2, 1960); FTC v. 
Danne, Cancellation No. 7152 (Comm'r Pat., filed Aug. 5, 1958), Bart Schwartz 
Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 665 (C.C.P.A. 1961).   But it was not until 
1978 that the FTC brought an action under Section 14 to cancel a mark on the 
basis of genericism.  The mark in that case was FORMICA, owned by a subsidiary 
of American Cyanamid Corporation, and the FTC asserted that the mark had 
become the common descriptive name for “laminated sheets of wood, fabric or 
paper impregnated with synthetic resin and consolidated under heat and pressure 
for use on table tops, furniture and wall panelling.” FTC v. Formica Corp., 
Cancellation No. 11955 (T.T.A.B., filed May 31, 1978); Formica Corp. v. 
Lefkowitz, 590 F.2d 915, 200 USPQ 641, 647 (CCPA 1979); Federal Trade 
Commission v. Formica Corp., 200 USPQ 182, 191 (TTAB 1978).  According to 
the FTC, American Cyanamid had used the mark “to charge higher prices and to 
stifle competition in the plastic laminates market costing consumers an estimated 
$10 million a year.” FTC v. Formica, Cancellation No. 11955, Petition for 
Cancellation at 1. The FTC’s action against Formica triggered strong responses. 
The President of Formica Corp. is reported to have warned that the FTC’s 
aggressive policing of generic trademarks “would have all American industries 
selling their products in plain brown wrappers.” Margulies, supra note 55 (quoting 
Martin B. Friedman). Spirited editorials condemned the FTC’s intervention, one 
accusing it of “engendering an ‘identity crisis’ in American business.” Margulies, 
supra note 55. One academic commentator characterized the relationship between 
the FTC and trademark owners as a “religious war.” McCarthy, supra note 55, at 
152. This public outcry led to Congressional hearings (Hearings on H.R. 3685 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of 
Justice, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)) and, eventually, the enactment of the FTC 
Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 391 (1980), which, 
among other things, prohibited the FTC from using any appropriated funds to 
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While each of these mechanisms for challenging a  mark as 
generic requires different procedural steps, the substantive 
requirements for a finding of genericism do not vary greatly from 
one such mechanism to another. In each case, whether a challenged 
mark is generic or descriptive is a question of fact.64 
 
A party bringing a cancellation action on the basis of genericism 
bears the burden of proving genericide by a preponderance of the 
evidence.65 The challenger’s task is made more difficult because the 
holder of a registered trademark, after meeting its initial burden in 
registration, benefits from a presumption of validity.66 
 
Despite the number of well-known marks that have fallen to 
genericide, not all genericism challenges are successful. In some 
cases, the evidence presented does not meet the required standard 
for showing that a challenged mark has taken on generic meaning in 
the public eye.  For example, a San Diego jury found in 2017 that 
Comic-Con International’s mark COMIC-CON was not generic after 
a challenge by Salt Lake City Comic Con, a group accused of 
infringing the mark.67 In reaching its verdict, the jury seemingly 
relied on evidence including a survey showing that 70% of 
respondents considered COMIC-CON to be a particular brand rather 
than a generic description of an event.   
 
In other cases, the owner of a challenged mark may show that 
the mark, even if it has taken on a generic meaning, is not being used 
in a generic manner. The most notable example of this approach 
arose in the highly-publicized genericism challenge to the mark 
GOOGLE.68 In that case, the challenger petitioned the USPTO for 
cancelation of the GOOGLE mark on the ground that “the word 
‘google’ is primarily understood as ‘a generic term universally used 
to describe the act[] of internet searching’”69 and that “verb use 
                                                 
petition to cancel the registration of any trademark on the basis of genericness for 
the next three fiscal years. Id. at § 18. Yet even after this statutory prohibition 
expired in 1982, it does not appear that the FTC ever again exercised its authority 
under Section 14 of the Lanham Act to challenge a trademark as generic. 
64 In re Hotels.com, LP, 573 F.3d 1300, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); In re Bayer 
AG, 488 F.3d 960, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
65 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 684 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
66 Coca-Cola Co., 692 F.2d at 1254. 
67 See Rob Salkowitz, Jury Decides For San Diego Comic-Con In Trademark 
Suit, Forbes, Dec. 17, 2017 (discussing survey and other evidence relied upon by 
jury in finding that COMIC-CON was not generic). 
68 Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2017). 
69 Id. at *4. 
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constitutes generic use as a matter of law”.70 But, as noted above, 
this challenge was unsuccessful.71 
 
Unlike other cancelation proceedings – resulting, for example, 
from a mark owner’s failure to use a mark in commerce – a finding 
of genericism will prevent others from registering the generic term 
as a mark.72 Thus, like an abandonment of rights under patent or 
copyright law, a finding of genericism generally has an estoppel 
effect on third parties, re-committing the generic term to the 
public.73 
 
C. Genericide Counter-Measures 
 
It is often the case that the holders of intellectual property rights 
will lose those rights based on their own conduct: failing to pay 
renewal or maintenance fees, failing to disclose prior art to the 
Patent and Trademark Office, misusing or abusing those rights in 
commercial transactions, and so on.  However, the loss of rights due 
to genericism arises from the use of a mark not only by the mark 
owner (though this is certainly possible), but also by competitors, 
consumers, the media, and others.74 Given the large investments that 
many firms make in building goodwill in their brand identities, 
trademark owners often go to great lengths to control, or at least 
influence, third party use of their marks so as to avoid claims of 
genericism.75  
 
There are generally three proactive approaches that mark owners 
have taken to decrease the likelihood that their marks will become 
generic. First, the mark owner can impose direct contractual 
obligations on licensed users of the mark. Thus, in trademark license 
agreements, it is common for mark owners to prohibit their licensees 
from using the licensed marks in a manner that might lead to their 
genericism.  These prohibitions often include prohibitions on use of 
the mark as a verb (e.g., don’t say “I am going to Xerox these 
papers”) or as a noun (e.g., don’t say “Where is the Xerox of my 
expense report?”).76 And while such restrictions would not be 
                                                 
70 Id. at *5. 
71 See notes 45-46, supra, and accompanying discussion. 
72 See Fietkiewicz, supra note 63, at 455-56. 
73 See id. Note, however, that under certain rare circumstances, a term that 
has been adjudged generic may be revived if it is shown to have achieved 
distinctiveness. See id. at n. 144; McCarthy at x. 
74 See Ingram, supra note 55, at 161. 
75 See, e.g., Johnson, Why Companies Don’t Want You to Take Their Brand 
Names in Vain, ECONOMIST, Sep. 9, 2017. 
76 See Ingram, supra note 55, at 160 (“Trademark owners should never use 
the trademark as a verb or noun, which implies that the word is generic”).  But see 
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unexpected in sophisticated commercial arrangements between 
mark owners and, for example, product manufacturers and 
distributors, these types of anti-genericide provisions also appear in 
mass market agreements that are intended for a much broader 
audience.77 
 
Second, mark owners can take their anti-genericide campaigns 
directly to the public – to users of consumers and products beyond 
contractual licensees. This sort of direct intervention can come in 
the form of product advertising, in which the mark owner reminds 
consumers that its mark designates a particular brand of product 
rather than the product itself. For example, Landes and Posner 
describe how General Foods diligently advertised the first widely-
distributed decaffeinated coffee as “Sanka-brand decaffeinated 
coffee” rather than simply “Sanka”.78 General Foods succeeded in 
preventing Sanka from becoming a generic term, and in promoting 
the alternative generic term “decaf”.79 
 
Xerox Corporation is perhaps the best known proponent of the 
direct-to-consumer counter-measure ad, producing a large quantity 
of advertising designed not to promote its products, but to protect its 
trademark.80  In the following clever advertisement, for example, 
Xerox evokes the genericism of the earlier mark zipper, pleading 
with readers not to use the term XEROX as a synonym for 
“photocopy”: 
  
                                                 
id. (“Of course, using a trademark only as an adjective and not as a verb is no 
guarantee that the mark will not be held to be generic. For example, "Light Beer" 
and "Lite Beer" were held "to be generic names for a type of beer light in body or 
taste and low in alcoholic and caloric content."' The same thing happened with 
"matchbox" toys and "safari" clothing.” (citations omitted)). 
77 See, e.g., Oracle Corp., Java Licensing Logo Guidelines, 
http://www.oracle.com/us/technologies/java/java-licensing-logo-guidelines-
1908204.pdf (2016); Bluetooth SIG, Bluetooth Trademark License Agreement 
(E-Sign Version 1.3 – Last Revised Dec. 14, 2016). 
78 Landes & Posner, supra note 57, at 294. 
79 Id. Other successful genericide counter-measure campaigns include 
Chrysler’s “They invented “SUV” because they can’t call them Jeep®”; Johnson 
& Johnson’s “I am stuck on Band-Aids brand cause Band-Aid’s stuck on me”; 
and Kimberly-Clark’s “ ‘Kleenex’ is a brand name…and should always be 
followed by an ® and the word ‘Tissue.’ Help us keep our identity, ours.” Gary 
H. Fechter & Elina Slavin, Practical Tips on Avoiding Genericide, 66 INTA 
BULLETIN, Nov. 15, 2011. 
80 See, e.g. Ingram, supra note 55, at 161. 
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Xerox Genericide Counter-Measure Ad81 
 
In ads like the one shown in Figure 1, the mark owner identifies 
a generic term that can be used instead of the trademark to describe 
the function of the product – its genus (e.g., “copy” or “photocopy”) 
– while reserving the trademark to identify the source of the product 
(e.g., a Xerox copier). Other attempts to append generic terms to 
product brand names include Scotch transparent tape, Kleenex facial 
tissue, Vaseline petroleum jelly, and Rollerblade in-line skates.82 As 
noted by Professors Lydia Loren and Joe Miller, “If the Otis 
Elevator Company, inventor of the escalator, had promoted the 
product as a “moving stairway,” escalator might still be a 
trademark.”83   
 
                                                 
81 Xerox Corp., Advertisement, ABA Journal (2010) (reproduced in Liz 
Johnstone, Dallas-Connected Xerox Corporation Probably Still Needs Your Help, 
FrontBurner, Nov. 13, 2012, 
https://www.dmagazine.com/frontburner/2012/11/dallas-connected-xerox-
corporation-probably-still-needs-your-help/). Additional Xerox ads in this vein 
may be found in ABA Journal, Feb. 2008 (reproduced in Loren & Miller, supra 
note 53, at 515) (again referencing zipper), Ingram, supra note 55, at 161 n.58 
(referencing ‘aspirin’) and Fechter & Slavin, supra note 79 (“You can’t Xerox a 
Xerox on a Xerox. But we don’t mind at all if you copy a copy on a Xerox® 
copier”).  Note that Xerox’s requests may be overly prescriptive.  As noted by the 
Ninth Circuit in Google, “verb use does not automatically constitute generic use”. 
Google, 860 F.3d at *17.  
82 See Loren & Miller, supra note 53, at 515; Ingram, supra note 55, at 159-
60, 162. 
83 Loren & Miller, supra note 53, at 515. 
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The third general approach taken by mark owners to protect their 
marks from becoming generic has been to police improper uses of 
the mark in the marketplace and then request that users cease and 
desist those uses, sometimes threatening litigation if they fail to 
comply.84 Professor John Ingram describes this approach as 
employed by The Coca-Cola Company, the owner of one of the most 
valuable marks in the world: 
 
Coca-Cola employs people to visit retail 
establishments which do not serve Coca-Cola 
products and specifically order Coca-Cola or a Coke. 
If the establishment serves a cola-type beverage 
without comment, the Coca-Cola employees send a 
sample of the beverage to Coca-Cola's laboratory for 
chemical analysis. If the beverage is determined to 
not be a Coca-Cola product, the company will ask 
that retail establishment to stop the deceptive 
practice. If the practice continues, Coca-Cola will 
bring suit for trademark infringement.85 
 
Of course, these prophylactic measures do not guaranty that a 
mark will not be challenged as generic, and many cancelation 
proceedings have been brought and won even after mark owners 
have taken such precautions. 
 
D. The Economics of Genericide 
 
More than thirty years ago, Professor William Landes and Judge 
Richard Posner developed an influential microeconomic model of 
trademark law that retains its currency today.86  In the Landes and 
                                                 
84 Ingram, supra note 55, at 161. By the same token, a lack of policing by the 
mark owner can constitute evidence that a mark has become generic.  See, e.g., 
Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1151; King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 579. 
85 Ingram, supra note 55, at 161-62. See also Margulies, supra note 55 
(“Coca-Cola engages in several hundred actions year to prevent establishments 
from arbitrarily pouring any other cola when the customer asks for a Coke. The 
folks at Coke don't want the first half of their name to go the route of the last”). 
Evidence was presented in Elliott v. Google that Google also aggressively 
threatened dictionaries and others that failed to acknowledge its registration of the 
term GOOGLE. Google, 860 F.3d at *19 n.9. 
86 Landes & Posner, supra note 57. To be sure, some economic analysis of 
trademark law existed prior to Landes and Posner’s work (see, e.g., Folsom & 
Tepley, supra note 56, at 1334-46; Lunney, Monopolies, supra note 22, at 367-69 
(noting earlier work)), but the work of Landes and Posner is viewed by many as 
the landmark work in the field. See, e.g., P. Sean Morris, Trademarks and the 
Economic Dimensions of Trademark Law in Europe and Beyond, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (May 30, 2016), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-
4614-7883-6_566-1 (referring to Landes and Posner’s contribution as a “seminal 
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Posner model, the “essential economic function” of trademarks is 
the reduction of consumer search costs.87 For a given product, 
consumer search costs associated with a product are inversely 
related to the strength of its trademark (the stronger the mark, the 
less consumers will have to search) and the number of other words 
that producers can use to describe the product (the more words that 
are available to describe the product (e.g., computer, electrical, 
heavy), the more accurately and economically the producer can 
advertise it).88 Because a strong trademark will reduce search costs, 
it will enable the producer to raise its price for the product, assuming 
that consumers will tolerate the same total cost for a product of a 
given quality level (i.e., its monetary price plus the consumer’s 
search cost).89  
 
Without protectable trademarks, firms producing lower quality 
products could advertise their products using exactly the same 
words as firms producing higher quality products, thus misleading 
consumers into thinking that the products’ quality levels were 
equivalent.90 It follows that the availability of trademarks, which 
distinguish one firm’s products from another, encourage firms to 
improve their own product quality.91 
 
If, however, a producer is permitted to appropriate generic terms 
that describe a product, then the stock of other words available to 
competitors will be reduced, increasing search costs for the 
competitors’ products. For example, if Apple could trademark the 
generic word “computer”, then other computer makers such as Dell, 
Lenovo and HP would be required to find other, less apt, words to 
describe their products (e.g., “computation platform” or “artificial 
intelligence machine”), thereby adding to consumer uncertainty and, 
consequently, increasing the total cost of their products.92 The result 
will be a deadweight loss, decreasing overall consumer surplus. 
Moreover, the appropriating firm will be able to extract economic 
rents, thus disadvantaging its competitors.93  For these reasons, the 
appropriation of generic terms as trademarks is viewed as 
                                                 
article which nowadays stands as the cornerstone on the economic analysis of 
trademark law”).  
87 Landes & Posner, supra note 57, at 275. 
88 Id. at 288. This description is necessarily simplified. The Landes-Posner 
model takes a number of other variables into account, but these are less relevant 
to the current discussion. 
89 Id. at 280. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 291-92 and Fig. 4 (this effect can be represented by a shift to the left 
of the supply curve for the affected competitors). 
93 Id. 
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II.  THE HISTORY OF SUI-GENERICIDE 
 
As discussed in Part I.A above, terms that identify a general 
category of goods, rather than the particular source of those goods 
(e.g., car, café and computer versus Prius, Starbucks and MacBook), 
are generic and cannot be registered or enforced as trademarks. A 
finding of genericism is typically made by the PTO during the 
examination of an application for trademark registration, or by a 
court or the TTAB following a challenge to a mark.  Given the large 
investments that many firms make in building brand identity and 
goodwill, as discussed in Part I.C, trademark owners such as Xerox 
often go to great lengths to prevent their marks from becoming 
generic. But, surprisingly, some trademark owners have taken a 
different approach. These firms have affirmatively stated that 
certain terms that might otherwise be protected as trademarks are 
generic. As such, they intentionally, and prior to any legal challenge, 
seek to relinquish rights in potentially valuable marks, a practice that 
I have termed sui-genericide. 
 
Despite the lack of scholarly attention to the phenomenon of 
sui-genericide, it is not a new phenomenon.  This Part discusses the 
largely forgotten history of the sui-genericide programs that arose 
during the mid-twentieth century, some of which remain quietly 
active today, then addresses an emerging trend in the area of 
technical interoperability standards. 
 
 
A. The Department of Commerce Generic Word Program – A 
Genericide Wish List 
 
Beginning in the early 1940s, American businesses started to 
become aware that foreign trademark applications were being filed 
on terms that were generic in the English language.94 Many of these 
terms described pharmaceutical products and ingredients, including 
ANTACID, VITAMIN, ANTI-HISTAMIN, NIACIN, B-COMPLEX, FOLIC 
ACID, PENICILLIN and STREPTOMYCIN.95 In 1942, the Proprietary 
Association, a trade association for non-prescription drug 
                                                 
94 See James F. Hoge, Protection of Generic and Descriptive Names from 
Trade-Mark Registration Abroad, 42 TRADEMARK REP. 514, 514 (1952). 
95 Id. at 514-15. 
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manufacturers,96 began to review and oppose these foreign 
applications.97 In 1951, the Proprietary Association joined forces 
with the American Drug Manufacturers Association and the 
American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association in this 
activity.98 By 1952 this coalition had reviewed 253 such foreign 
applications in twenty countries and filed 112 oppositions, resulting 
in forty-three cancelations and fifteen withdrawals.99 
 
Beginning sometime in the late 1940s, shortly after the passage 
of the Lanham Act, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of 
Foreign Commerce (later the Bureau of International Commerce) 
initiated its own program to oppose foreign trademark applications 
seeking to register generic English terms.100 Though the Bureau’s 
“Generic Word Program” initially focused on pharmaceutical terms, 
it soon expanded to cover all product categories of interest to 
American industry.101 Under the Program, the Bureau invited 
interested U.S. parties to notify it of attempts abroad to register 
generic English words as trademarks. The theory underlying the 
Program was that if generic English language terms became 
trademarks in foreign jurisdictions, U.S. firms would be unable to 
use those terms in their foreign advertising, and also that American-
made products bearing those generic terms could be excluded from 
the relevant foreign markets.102 Thus, in was in the interest of U.S. 
firms to self-identify terms that they wished to keep generic, both 
abroad and, presumably, at home. 
 
 The majority of the notices under the Generic Word Program, 
which amounted to over 100 per year by 1965, were submitted to 
the Bureau by the U.S. Trademark Association (a trade organization 
                                                 
96 The Proprietary Association was formed in 1881; in 1989 it changed its 
name to the Consumer Healthcare Products Association. See Consumer 
Healthcare Prods. Assn., About CHPA, https://www.chpa.org/about.aspx (visited 
Mar. 27, 2019). 
97 Hoge, supra note 94, at 515. 
98 Id. at 514. 
99 Id. at 515. 
100 Walter J. Derenberg, The Third Year of Administration of the Lanham 
Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 40 TRADEMARK REP. 914, 946 (1950). 
101 For an insider’s description of the Generic Word Program, see, generally, 
Vincent D. Travaglini, Industrial Property Rights and Foreign Trade, 51 
TRADEMARK REP. 545, 552-54 (1961); Joseph M. Lightman, Protection of 
Generic Words against Trademark Registration Abroad, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 80, 
80-83 (1964); Vincent D. Travaglini & Joseph M. Lightman, Department of 
Commerce Assistance Available to United States Firms in Protection Abroad 
against Unfair Trade Practices, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 740, 741-43 (1965).  
102 Lightman, supra note 101, at 80. 
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now known as the International Trademark Association (INTA)).103 
According to one Bureau official, the program worked as follows: 
 
When the Bureau of International Commerce learns 
of a foreign generic word application, it prepares 
instructions containing appropriate details 
concerning the application, for transmittal to the 
American Embassy in the country of application. 
The Embassy, in effect, is asked to lodge a protest 
with the foreign Government in efforts to have the 
application denied. The Embassy is also instructed to 
emphasize to Governmental authorities the 
detrimental effects which the registration could have 
on significant segments of trade between the U. S. 
and their country. These Embassy approaches are not 
intended to replace the entering of formal 
oppositions to objectionable registrations. They 
serve as informal representations against the 
potentially adverse trade effects of such attempted 
registrations. In some countries, the authorities will 
deny an application as a result of the Embassy's 
approach; in others they have made it clear that a 
private formal opposition must be filed before a 
denial can be considered.104 
 
According to two Bureau officials writing in 1965, the Generic 
Word Program resulted in the denial of hundreds of foreign 
trademark applications “which, if granted, would have prevented 
American exporters of the goods concerned from making shipments 
to the countries where the applications were filed.”105 Generic terms 
as to which the Bureau successfully objected to foreign registration 
include WASH-AND-WEAR, T-SHIRT, ELASTIC, COTTON, SILK, AUTO 
PAINT, PRIMER PAINT, AUTO ENAMEL, LACQUER, SATIN, TRACTOR, 
DIESEL, AUTO PARTS, OVERDRIVE, CHARCOAL, INTERCOM, RADAR, 
SONAR, VIDEO, BEARINGS, CHOCOLATE, SNACK, CRISP, CORN FLAKES, 
EGG BACON, OLD FASHIONED, ICE, JELLY-BEANS, MINESTRONE, 
BISCUIT, CHEESECAKE, MOZZARELLA and BANANAS.106 
 
                                                 
103 Travaglini & Lightman, supra note 101, at 742. 
104 Lightman, supra note 101, at 81. 
105 Travaglini & Lightman, supra note 101, at 742. The authors further 
explain that “[w]hile many such applications may be routinely denied by the local 
authorities, experience has shown that some will be accepted unless there is active 
intervention to prevent registration.” Id. at 741. 
106 Travaglini, supra note 101, at 553-54; Lightman, supra note 101, at 83; 
Travaglini & Lightman, supra note 101, at 742-43; In re Le Sorbet, Inc., 228 
U.S.P.Q. 27, *4 n.15 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 1985). 
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The Generic Word Program, which appears to have ended 
sometime in the late 1980s,107 represents an important first step 
toward sui-genericide. Though the U.S. firms who submitted terms 
to the Bureau through USTA did not themselves make any express 
representation or commitment regarding the generic nature of those 
terms, it is likely that their submission of terms to the Generic Word 
Program had the practical effect of an admission of genericness or, 
in the alternative, a commitment not to seek registration of the 
submitted terms.108 
  
B. Generic Drug Names 
 
Every drug on the market today generally has three different 
names: a chemical name, a generic or nonproprietary name and a 
proprietary or brand name. While drug manufacturers seek to 
differentiate themselves and enhance their brands via advertising, 
packaging and other means,109 it is important for public health and 
safety purposes to have a consistent set of nonproprietary names that 
all manufacturers can use to refer to drugs having the same active 
ingredients. For example, Advil® and Motrin® are well-known 
brands of the same pain medication – ibuprofen -- which bears the 
chemical name (RS)-2-(4-(2-methylpropyl)phenyl)propanoic 
acid.110 The chemical name clearly being too complex for routine 
usage, most physicians, pharmacists and consumers will refer to the 
drug either by its brand name or, when referring to a class of drugs, 
by its generic name. 
 
                                                 
107 The actual termination date of the Generic Word Program is not clear, but 
no references to it have been located after 1985. See Le Sorbet, 228 U.S.P.Q. 27 
at *4 n.15; Robert Brauneis & Anke Moerland, Monopolizing Matratzen in 
Malaga: The Mistreatment of Distinctiveness of Foreign Terms in EU and US 
Trademark Law at MS pp. 7-8 (working draft 2018, copy on file with author) 
(estimating end date of program to be in 1980s). 
108 See Part IV.D, infra (discussing legal enforceability of submitting firms’ 
position re. genericism of submitted terms). 
109 Proprietary drug names are often created de novo as fanciful terms (e.g., 
Viagra, Lipitor, Tylenol, etc.) and are thus among the strongest trademarks. For a 
description of the lengthy and complex process used to select proprietary names 
for pharmaceutical products, see, e.g., Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201 
F. Supp. 2d 335, 340-47 (D.N.J. 2002). 
110 See WebMD, Ibuprofen Oral, https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-
5166-9368/ibuprofen-oral/ibuprofen-oral/details (visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
Chemical names, which are generally of limited commercial value due to their 
complexity and unfamiliarity, are assigned by the International Union of Pure and 
Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), an international scientific and standardization body 
founded in 1919. See Int’l Union of Pure & Applied Chemistry, Who We Are, 
https://iupac.org/who-we-are/ (visited Mar. 30, 2019). In addition to chemical 
nomenclature, the IUPAC assigns names to newly discovered elements and 
develops standardized units of measure, among other things. Id. 
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As noted in Part II.A, above, the registration of generic terms by 
foreign trademark applicants was first perceived as a threat by the 
U.S. pharmaceutical industry in the early 1940s. While the 
Proprietary Association’s opposition to the registration of generic 
terms such as ANTACID and PENICILLIN helped to limit these foreign 
registrations, it soon became clear that individual opposition 
proceedings were costly and not always successful.111 Likewise, 
diplomatic efforts by the Bureau through the Generic Words 
Program could not be relied upon to protect the increasing number 
of pharmaceutical compound names employed by the industry. A 
more comprehensive solution was required. 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) was formed in 1946 as 
specialized agency of the United Nations. Under the WHO charter, 
one of the agency’s goals is “to develop, establish and promote 
international standards with respect to food, biological, 
pharmaceutical and similar products.”112 In 1948, the initial World 
Health Assembly (the decision-making body of WHO113) resolved 
to develop a harmonized international pharmacopeia.114 Pursuant to 
that resolution, the World Health Assembly created a formal 
program for selecting international nonproprietary names (INN) for 
pharmaceutical compounds.115 Through the INN program, which 
was launched in 1953 and continues today,116 the WHO publishes a 
list of pharmaceutical substance names that are intended to be used 
generically by the industry. As of 2017, approximately 9,300 terms 
have been designated as INNs, with approximately 160 more added 
each year.117 
 
Figure 2 below is an example of the entry for a recommended 
INN as published by the WHO in its cumulative list of INNs.118 
 
                                                 
111 Hoge, supra note 94, at 515 (of 112 oppositions filed between 1942 and 
1952, only 43 resulted in cancelation of the targeted application or mark, with 
another 15 withdrawals). 
112 World Health Org. Constitution Art. 2(u) (1946). 
113 See World Health Org., World Health Assembly, 
https://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en/  
114 World Health Org., WHA1.21 (Jul. 1948). 
115 World Health Org., WHA3.11 (1950). 
116 WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL 
NONPROPRIETARY NAMES (INNS) FOR PHARMACEUTICAL SUBSTANCES 19 (2017) 
[hereinafter WHO INN Guidelines]. 
117 WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 5. 
118 WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL NONPROPRIETARY NAMES (INN) 
FOR PHARMACEUTICAL SUBSTANCES CD-ROM (2017). 
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Published INN Entry - paracetamol 
 
Source: WHO INN Guidelines, p. 10 
 
WHO has established detailed rules for the designation of INNs, 
including appropriate word stems (e.g., “-aldrate” for antacids and 
“-imex” for immunostimulants), number of syllables, use of 
hyphens, and the like.119 Any organization may propose a new INN 
to WHO using a standardized application form120 in which the 
applicant represents that “insofar as is known, none of the suggested 
names is either registered or pending registration” as a trademark121 
and discloses any trademark issued for the relevant drug.122 
Proposed INNs are reviewed by a WHO expert advisory panel for 
compliance with these rules.123 If the proposed INN is deemed 
allowable, it is published by WHO for public comment.124 During 
the four-month public comment period, a formal objection may be 
                                                 
119 WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 11-12 and Annexes 2-4. 
120 World Health Org., Request for an International Nonproprietary Name 
(reproduced in WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at Annex 7) [hereinafter 
INN Request Form]. See also WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 14-18 
(describing application process). 
121 INN Request Form, supra note 120. 
122 WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 16. 
123 Id. at 6, 49 (Expert Advisory Panel on the International Pharmacopoeia 
and Pharmaceutical Preparations). 
124 Id. at 49. 
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filed by any person (e.g., another manufacturer, a trade association 
such as INTA or a government) who believes that the proposed INN 
“is in conflict with an existing trademark”.125 Upon receipt of such 
an objection, WHO “will actively pursue an arrangement to obtain 
a withdrawal of such an objection or will reconsider the proposed 
name.”126 Following the public comment period, once all 
outstanding objections have been withdrawn, WHO will publish the 
INN in its next semi-annual list of recommended INNs.127 
 
While WHO claims that INNs “are formally placed by WHO in 
the public domain,”128 and that “trademarks cannot be derived from 
INNs” 129 these claims are somewhat overstated.  As a U.N. agency, 
with no formal treaty or international agreement in place relating to 
INNs, WHO has no formal authority to dictate how national 
trademark offices or private parties treat INNs. Thus, in 1993, the 
World Health Assembly adopted a resolution requesting WHO 
member states “to develop policy guidelines on the use and 
protection of international nonproprietary names, and to discourage 
the use of names derived from INNs, and particularly names 
including established INN stems as trade-marks.”130 To facilitate the 
adoption of this recommendation, the WHO produced an 
Information Leaflet for Trademark Departments, offering advice 
regarding INNs to national trademark offices.131 Thus, while 
decisions concerning the registration of INNs remain solely with 
national trademark offices and courts,132 the WHO INN program 
serves a valuable function by coordinating industry usage and 
promoting norms of genericism with respect to recognized INNs. 
 
The WHO INN process also plays an important role in the 
approval of generic drug names in particular countries, including the 
                                                 
125 Id. at 6. See also Lightman, supra note 101, at 84-85 (discussing U.S. 
government interaction with INN program). 
126 Id. at 6. 
127 World Health Org., Lists of Recommended and Proposed INNs, 
https://www.who.int/medicines/publications/druginformation/innlists/en/ 
(visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
128 WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 6. 
129 Id. at 7. 
130 World Health Org., WHA46.19 (May 1993). 
131 World Health Org., Information Leaflet for Trademark Departments 
(n.d.), https://www.who.int/medicines/services/inn/flyerINN.pdf?ua=1  
132 It is telling that neither the TMEP, supra note 52, nor the FDA’s Best 
Practices in Developing Proprietary Names for Drugs (2014) contain any 
references to the WHO INN program or terms that are designated as INNs in 
describing what terms may and may not be registered as proprietary names for 
drugs. See Part IV.B, infra. But while the U.S. may fail to give official recognition 
to INNs, other countries have adopted laws and rules prohibiting the registration 
of INNs as trademarks. See Part IV.E, infra. 
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United States. In the United States, generic drug names are assigned 
by the United States Adopted Name Council (USAN Council), a 
joint undertaking of the American Medical Association (AMA), the 
United States Pharmacopeia (USP), and the American Pharmacists 
Association (APhA), cooperating with the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).133 While many generic drug names were 
originally condensed versions of the relevant chemical names, that 
is no longer the case.134 The USAN Council has adopted a detailed 
set of guidelines regarding appropriate nomenclature for generic 
drug names, including rules for assigning the prefix, infix and stem 
(suffix) components of a particular name.135 These guidelines 
specify that “[a] name should not conflict, mislead or be confused 
with other nonproprietary names and with established 
trademarks.”136 In addition, a generic name prefix should not imply 
that a drug is better, newer or more effective than other compounds, 
nor should it evoke the name of a manufacturer, medical condition 
or part of the human anatomy.137 
 
The process for creating a new generic drug name is initiated by 
a manufacturer who submits an application for the name to the 
                                                 
133 The USAN Council grew out of the AMA-USP Nomenclature Committee, 
which has been adopting common drug names since 1961. Joseph B. Jerome, 
Review: United States Adopted Names (USAN). Cumulative List No. 1, 1961-
1962, 186 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1104 (1963). In 1964, the APhA joined this group 
to form the USAN Council. 21 C.F.R. 299.4(c) (2014). 
134 Am. Med. Assn., United States Adopted Names Naming Guidelines, 
https://www.ama-assn.org/about/united-states-adopted-names/united-states-
adopted-names-naming-guidelines (visited Mar. 30, 2019) [hereinafter USAN 
Naming Guidelines]. 
135 See USAN Naming Guidelines, supra note 134: 
 
Drugs with the same ending (stem) belong to the same pharmacologic 
family. Infixes, appearing in the middle of the word, are sometimes used 
to further classify the drug. Prefixes mean nothing. The sole purpose of 
a prefix is to differentiate a drug from other members of the class.  As an 
example, consider sildenafil (Viagra™), vardenafil (Levitra™), and 
tadalafil (Cialis™). The -afil stem is formally defined as for PDE5 
(phosphodiesterase 5) inhibitors. The -den- infix indicates that sildenafil 
and vardenafil have similar chemical structures. The prefixes are sil-, 
var- and tadal-. 
 
See also Carmen Drahl, Where Drug Names Come From, 90 CHEMICAL 
& ENGINEERING NEWS, Iss. 3, 36 (2012) (explaining idiosyncratic origin 
of prefixes for several drugs including dasatinib (named for researcher 
Jagabandhu Das), asunaprevir (named for chemist Li-Qiang Sun) and 
carfilzomib (named for molecular biologist Philip Whitcome and his 
wife, Carla, who both succumbed to cancer). 
 
136 USAN Naming Guidelines, supra note 134. 
137 Id. 
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USAN Council.138 The applicant is required to include with its 
application a verification that the proposed generic name does not 
conflict with “existing chemical names, insecticides, other 
nonproprietary names or trademarks.”139 The application is first 
reviewed by USAN staff for potential conflicts with existing 
trademarks and other generic names.140 If no such conflicts are 
found, then the USAN Council will review and vote on the approval 
of the name.  If approved, then USAN will submit the name to WHO 
for INN review and a name will not be approved until INN approval 
is obtained from WHO.141 
 
Though neither the WHO nor the USAN Council formally 
prohibit a party from seeking or obtaining trademark protection for 
a term that is designated as an INN or a USAN, or prevent national 
trademark offices from issuing such trademarks, the longstanding 
and widespread use of these two systems, as well as the FDA’s 
endorsement of the USAN in the United States, seem to create a 
strong disincentive to the registration of such terms as trademarks. 
Moreover, were a rogue party to file a trademark application 
covering a USAN or INN, it is likely that, given active monitoring 
by trade groups such as INTA and the AMA, the application would 
quickly be opposed both by competing manufacturers as well as 
trade associations interested in preserving the integrity of the 
generic drug naming system. As a result, generic drug names are, 
for all practical purposes, generic for trademark purposes as well. 
 
C. Pesticide Common Names 
 
Like pharmaceutical products, pesticides each have a chemical 
name, a common or generic name and, in some cases, a brand or 
proprietary name.  In the United States, the regulation and oversight 
of pest control products and programs was historically shared by a 
number of federal agencies including the Public Health Service, the 
Department of Agriculture, and the Departments of War and the 
                                                 
138 Am. Med. Assn., USAN Application Forms, https://www.ama-
assn.org/about/united-states-adopted-names/usan-application-forms (visited Mar. 
30, 2019). 
139 See, e.g., Am. Med. Assn., Form A - USAN Application for Single Entity 
Drug and Salt Form,  
140 Am. Med. Assn., USAN Negotiation Process, https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/usan/usan-
process.pdf (visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
141 Am. Med. Assn., USAN/INN Negotiation Process, https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/usan-inn-negotiation-
process.pdf (visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
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Navy.142 Given this diversity of activity, a federal Interdepartmental 
Committee on Pest Control was formed in 1946 to help these 
agencies to coordinate their activities, research and public 
communication.143 Among the Committee’s first activities was “the 
adoption of coined names for insecticides” to be used in lieu of the 
complex and lengthy chemical names in product labeling and other 
communications.144  
 
In 1954, the task of developing these common names for 
pesticides was handed off to the American Standards Association 
(ASA),145 a private sector body that led U.S. efforts on 
standardization in a variety of industrial sectors.146 A committee 
(ASA Committee K-62) was formed that year comprising 
representatives of governmental agencies and medical and scientific 
societies, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.147 Significantly, both the U.S. Patent Office and the 
USTA were included as members of Committee K-62.148 The 
Committee charter included the development and approval of 
common names for herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, rodenticides 
and other chemicals.149 Committee K-62 also coordinated with the 
International Standardization Organization (ISO) Technical 
Committee 81 (ISO/TC 81), which established international 
standards for common names for pesticides and other 
agrochemicals.150 
 
In 1956, Committee K-62 approved a procedure for the proposal 
and approval of common names for pest control chemicals, which it 
published as American Standard K62.1-1956.151 This procedure was 
                                                 
142 See Establishment of an Interdepartmental Committee on Pest Control, 39 
J. ECONOMIC ENTOMOLOGY 823, 823 (1946). The large-scale eradication and 
control of disease-bearing insects was pioneered by the Army Corps of Engineers 
and Public Health Service in the early twentieth century to support U.S. military 
activity in tropical locations such as Cuba and Panama.  See, e.g., DAVID 
MCCULLOCH, THE PATH BETWEEN THE SEAS x (1977). 
143 See Establishment of an Interdepartmental Committee on Pest Control, 39 
J. ECON. ENTOMOLOGY 823, 823 (1946). 
144 See The Interdepartmental Committee on Pest Control, 44  J. ECON. 
ENTOMOLOGY 1029, 1029 (1951). 
145 George W. Fiero, Report on Program of Common Names for Pesticides, 
53 TRADEMARK REP. 553, 553 (1963). 
146 See ANDREW L. RUSSELL, OPEN STANDARDS AND THE DIGITAL AGE: 
HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND NETWORKS 63 (2014). 
147 Fiero, supra note 145, at 553-54.  
148 Id. at 553-54. 
149 Id. at 554. 
150 Id. at 553. 
151 Am. Standards Assn., American Standard K62.1-1956 - American 
Standard Procedure for the Acceptance of an American Standard Common Name 
for a Pest Control Chemical (Feb. 28, 1956) (reproduced in R. Behrens et al., 
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intended “to make possible the adoption of common names readily 
acceptable and usable by all interested groups, while guarding 
against confusion with existing common or proprietary names and 
against improper use in the future.”152 Under this procedure, new 
common names for pesticides would be proposed to ASA by a 
sponsor – either the product manufacturer or another organization 
having an interest in the product.153 Proposed names had to comply 
with a number of technical criteria,154 but also had to be free of 
potential trademark claims.  In particular, the sponsor of a proposed 
name was required to certify to ASA that 
 
a search has been conducted and findings are 
submitted to verify the absence of conflicts with 
existing domestic trademarks or names for other 
chemicals or products. Should the proposed 
Common Name itself be trade-marked or be in 
apparent conflict with any domestic trade-mark or 
trade name, the Sponsor shall submit to the 
Committee a written statement from the trade-mark 
owner releasing the proposed Common Name for 
unrestricted use.155 
 
The sponsor was thus required to represent not only that it would 
not claim trademark rights in an approved common name, but also 
that it had searched and determined either that the proposed name 
was not subject to competing trademark rights, or that it had 
obtained the commitment of the holder of trademark rights 
permitting the use of the mark as a common pesticide name. This 
procedure indicates a strong interest in trademarks by the industrial 
members of Committee K-62, and a strong desire to keep pesticide 
common names free from trademark encumbrances. 
 
In 1969 ASA became the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI), which continued the work of Committee K-62 through 
                                                 
Terminology Committee Report: Weed Society of America, 4 WEEDS 278, 284-87 
(1956) [hereinafter ASA K62.1-1956]. 
152 ASA K.62.1-1956, supra note 151, at § 1.1. 
153 Id. at § 2.6. 
154 Id. at §§ 3.3-3.4. 
155 Id. at § 3.5.  The form of written statement was included in Section 4.2.11: 
“The undersigned agrees to release and permit the use of the name '________' (the 
proposed common name) for use with respect to any product, whether or not 
manufactured or formulated by the undersigned, which contains a pest control 
chemical conforming to the description of the pest control chemical specified by 
ASA in an American Standard adopted and made public pursuant to this 
Statement.” See also Fiero, supra note 145, at 557-59 (sample application with 
trademark disclosures). 
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approximately 1997.156 In 1997, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), whose regulations require that the “accepted 
common name” of a pesticide be displayed on the product label,157 
expressly deferred to ANSI’s Committee K-56 for purposes of 
determining pesticide common names.158  
 
After 1997, however, possibly due to declining funding and 
interest by the committee’s sponsor, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, ANSI discontinued both Committee K-62 and its 
participation in ISO/TC 81. The last version of ANSI’s K.62.1 
naming procedure was published in 1985 and withdrawn by ANSI 
as inactive in 2001.159  
 
Today, pesticide common names are developed and maintained 
largely by ISO/TC 81, which has nine participating members and 32 
observing members (none of which are from the U.S.).160 ISO 
standard 257:2018 (originally published in 1976) lays out guidelines 
for the development of common names for pesticides and other 
agrochemicals, with the goal of creating “short, distinctive, easily 
pronounced names, which will be common to all languages.”161 As 
in the defunct ANSI procedure, common pesticide names are 
generally proposed by private companies with an interest in the field 
and then reviewed by ISO TC/81. 
 
D. Synthetic Textile Fibers 
 
In the mid-twentieth century, mass-produced synthetic fibers 
such as nylon and polyester began to replace natural fibers such as 
wool and cotton in clothing, linens and a variety of other consumer 
                                                 
156 A search of the web store of the commercial standards vendor SAI Global 
(infostore.saiglobal.com) for the term ANSI K.62.1 yields 102 standards, each of 
which was last updated in 1997 (search conducted Apr. 1, 2019). 
157 40 CFR 156.10(g). 
158 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, PRN 97-5: Use of Common 
Names for Active Ingredients on Pesticide Labeling, § IV.C 
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/prn-97-5-use-common-names-active-
ingredients-pesticide-labeling “EPA prefers that common names for chemicals be 
established through standards-setting organizations such as ANSI.”) 
159 Information provided to author by ANSI Web Store supervisor via 
telephone (212-642-4980) on Apr. 1, 2019. 
160 Int’l Standardization Org., ISO/TC 81, 
https://www.iso.org/committee/50160.html (visited Apr. 1, 2019). Interestingly, 
the EPA still refers to ANSI’s development of pesticide common names in 
materials as recent as 2012.  See, e.g., Envt’l Prot. Agency, Label Review Manual 
at p. 5-3 (2012) (“EPA will permit the use of common names approved by the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in the labeling ingredients 
statement without the accompanying scientific chemical names”). 
161 Int’l Standardization Org., ISO 257:2018, Introduction. 
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products.162 Under the 1958 Textile Fiber Products Identification 
Act,163 manufacturers are required to affix to every textile fiber 
product a stamp, tag or label that discloses the fiber content, by 
weight, of each textile product with reference to that fiber’s generic 
name.164 Civil and criminal penalties may be imposed with respect 
to the sale or advertising of textile fiber products that are 
“misbranded or falsely or deceptively advertised”.165  
 
Authority for assigning appropriate generic names to different 
synthetic fibers under the Act resides with the FTC.166 When 
developing its initial list of sixteen generic names for common 
synthetic fibers, including acrylic, acetate, polyester and nylon, the 
FTC held extensive consultations with representatives of private 
industry regarding the parameters for developing such generic 
terms.167 It was decided that such generic terms would be defined 
based on a fiber’s chemical composition. For example, “acetate” is 
defined as “a manufactured fiber in which the fiber-forming 
substance is cellulose acetate...”168 whereas other definitions are 
significantly more complex and include detailed chemical diagrams 
and formulae.169 
 
Since 1977, the FTC has stopped developing its own fiber names 
and has instead adopted the names designated by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) in ISO standard 2076.170 
This standard is maintained and reviewed every five years by ISO 
                                                 
162 See A.F. Richards, Nylon Fibres in SYNTHETIC FIBRES: NYLON, 
POLYESTER, ACRYLIC, POLYOLEFIN 20, 20-21 (J.E. McIntyre, ed., 2005).  
Synthetic fibers are generally understood to be “manufactured from polymers 
built up from chemical elements or compounds” and to exclude fibers made from 
naturally-occurring fiber-forming polymers such as rayon, which is made from 
regenerated cellulose, which was introduced to the market much earlier. Id. at 1. 
163 P.L. 85-897, 72 Stat. 1712 (Sept. 2, 1958, codified at 15 USC § 70 et seq.). 
The Textile Fiber Products Identification Act followed the pattern of earlier 
chapters of the FTC’s authorizing legislation relating, for example, to the sale and 
advertising of natural fiber products such as wool (15 USC § 68 et seq.) and fur 
(15 USC § 69 et seq.).  See also 16 CFR Part 303 (Rules and Regulations Under 
The Textile Fiber Products Identification Act). 
164 15 USC § 70b(b). 
165 15 USC § 70a(a)-(c) (establishing liability), § 70f (injunction 
proceedings), § 70g (exclusion of imports), § 70i (criminal misdemeanor 
penalties). 
166 15 USC § 70e(c). 
167 See Lightman, supra note 101, at 83. 
168 16 CFR Part 303.7(e). 
169 See, e.g., 16 CFR Part 303.7(c) (polyester). 
170 See 16 CFR Part 303.7 (incorporating ISO standard ISO 2076:2010(E) by 
reference). 
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Technical Committee 38 (ISO/TC 38 – Textiles).171 ISO/TC 38 
currently has twenty-nine participating members including the 
United States, represented by ANSI, and forty-six observing 
members.172  
 
In a manner similar to the Generic Word Program, the FTC has 
coordinated with the Department of State and U.S. embassies abroad 
to request (with some measure of success) that foreign governments 
prohibit the registration of these synthetic fiber names as 
trademarks.173 Thus, the FTC, in its capacity as the overseer of fair 
advertising in the U.S., has taken an active role in ensuring the 
recognition of these fiber names as generic terms. Yet even here, the 
generic terms for synthetic fibers originate with industry players 
who then participate in a process overseen by the FTC. 
 
E. Government Engagement With Sui-Genericide Today 
 
By the late 1970s, U.S. federal agencies became increasingly 
hesitant to involve themselves directly in industrial standardization 
activities, culminating in the adoption, in 1980, of OMB Circular A-
119, which expressly instructs federal agencies to defer to private 
standardization efforts absent a compelling need for 
governmentally-developed standards.174 As a result, efforts such as 
the Generic Word Program and other direct federal participation in 
the development of common names for U.S.-manufactured products 
wound down by the mid-1980s. 
 
This being said, the U.S. government is still actively involved in 
some aspects of common names.  Thus, while the naming of generic 
drugs has largely been assumed in the U.S. by the private USAN 
Council in coordination with WHO, the FDA has taken an active 
                                                 
171Int’l Org. Standardization, ISO 2076:2013 (Textiles -- Man-made fibres -- 
Generic names), https://www.iso.org/standard/56206.html (visited Mar. 31, 
2019). It appears that through the most recent revision in 2013, the 1977 list has 
been retained. Id. 
172 Int’l Org. Standardization, Participation – ISO/TC 38 – Textiles, 
https://www.iso.org/committee/48148.html?view=participation (visited Mar. 31, 
2019). 
173 See Lightman, supra note 101, at 83. Interestingly, one Department of 
Commerce official reports that at the beginning of the program, “some of these 
words had been registered abroad by American companies prior to their … 
designation by the Federal Trade Commission. In these cases, the Commission 
worked out appropriate arrangements with the U. S. companies not to exercise 
any restrictive rights on sales abroad of goods bearing these terms.” Lightman, 
supra note 101, at 84. 
174 Off. Mgt. Budget, Circular A-119: [cite]. See, generally, Emily Bremer 
[2019 chapter]. 
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role in seeking to develop guidelines for the development of 
common names for new biological products.175 
 
In addition, though the Department of Commerce Bureau of 
Foreign Commerce (and successor Bureau of International 
Commerce) no longer exist to discourage foreign trademark offices 
from registering generic English terms through the Generic Word 
Program, the USPTO advocates to “improve IP policies, laws, and 
regulations abroad for the benefit of U.S. businesses and 
stakeholders” through its IP Attaché Program.176 Likewise, the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR) identifies foreign IP practices that are 
of concern to U.S. industry and seeks to “use all possible sources of 
leverage to encourage other countries to … provide adequate and 
effective protection and enforcement of U.S. intellectual property 
(IP) rights.”177  
 
With respect to generic terms, the USTR has actively opposed 
the protection of geographic indications (GIs) by the European 
Union when those GIs are viewed as common names for foodstuffs 
exported by U.S. manufacturers.178 For example, the USTR opposed 
the EU’s designation of “danbo” as a geographic indication for a 
type of cheese made in Denmark (pursuant to which only producers 
located in the Danbo region could use that term to describe their 
cheese products), as manufacturers in the U.S. and elsewhere use 
“danbo” as the common name for this variety of cheese.179 Similar 
concerns have been expressed with respect to other cheese varieties 
such as fontina, gongonzola, asiago and feta, as well as non-
agricultural products including including apparel, ceramics, glass, 
handicrafts, manufactured goods, minerals, salts, stones, and 
textiles.180 And far from being only a bilateral U.S.-EU issue, 
                                                 
175 See U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUMAN SVCS. – FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
NONPROPRIETARY NAMING OF BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS: UPDATE GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY – DRAFT GUIDANCE (Mar. 2019). 
176 U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., IP Attaché Program, 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/intellectual-property-
rights-ipr-attach-program/intellectual?MURL=ipattache (visited Apr. 29, 2019). 
177 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2019 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 5 (Apr. 2019) 
[hereinafter Special 301 Report]. 
178 Id. at 20. Common names for food products are designated by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, a collaboration of the WHO and the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO). See FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE U.N. 
AND WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS 17 
(2016). 
179 Special 301 Report, supra note 177, at 20. See also Consortium for 
Common Food Names, EU Turns its Back on Codex Cheese Standards by 
Approving GI for Generic Name, Dec. 1, 2017, 
http://www.commonfoodnames.com/eu-turns-its-back-on-codex-cheese-
standards-by-approving-gi-for-generic-name/ (visited Apr. 29, 2019). 
180 Special 301 Report, supra note 177, at 20. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043 
CONTRERAS – SUI-GENERICIDE 
36 
 
international disputes regarding the treatment of generic and 
common names have arisen with numerous countries.181 
 
F. Technical Standards 
 
A somewhat different recent example of sui-genericide has 
arisen in the context of technical interoperability standards – 
protocols like Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and 4G/5G that enable different  
manufacturers’ products to communicate with each other.  In most 
cases, these standards are developed within trade associations 
known as standards-development organizations (SDOs), which  
include ISO (mentioned above), the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI) and the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA).182 Private 
firms make technical contributions to standards within these SDOs 
and, once draft standards are advanced to a level suitable for 
implementation in products, vote to approve and publish standards 
through the SDO.183 
 
1. Trademarks and Technical Standards184 
 
Though standards largely play a technical role and are 
implemented in products that are manufactured and sold not by the 
SDO, but by firms that may or may not be SDO members, the names 
of standards (referred to here as standard-names) can play an 
important role in the market for technology products of all kinds. 
 
                                                 
181 See, e.g., Special 301 Report, supra note 177, at 30 and 81 (Costa Rica) 
and 48 (China). 
182 See, generally, Brad Biddle, No Standard for Standards: Understanding 
the ICT Standards-Development Ecosystem, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, 
Ch. 2 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2018) (describing the broad range of SDOs active 
in technology markets). 
183 Id. 
184 Trademarks relating to technical standards have received relatively scant 
attention in the literature compared to patents and copyrights.  For an overview of 
the use of trademarks with technical standards, see Jorge L. Contreras, 
Trademarks, Certification Marks and Technical Standards in CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: FURTHER INTERSECTIONS 
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW, Chapter X (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2019).  In 
contrast, there is an extensive literature relating to copyrights and patents covering 
technical standards, including requirements to license those patents on terms that 
are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND), see Jorge L. Contreras, 
Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and Intellectual Property: 
A Survey of the Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 
VOL. II – ANALYTICAL METHODS (Peter S. Menell & David Schwartz, eds., 2019, 
forthcoming) (review of literature). 
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When a consumer shops for a new smartphone, she 
will likely check whether different models 
implement a range of common standards such as Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth, and 4G (soon 5G). Likewise, the 
typical consumer knows that when she switches from 
a phone that is charged using a microUSB connector 
to one that uses Apple’s “Lightning” connector or the 
more recent USB-C connector, she will need to 
replace her charging cables as well. Most consumers 
have only the vaguest notion of how the standards 
behind these technologies work. Nevertheless, 
consumers are familiar with the functionality 
associated with these simple trade names. The names 
of technical standards thus fulfill a critical 
informational role for consumers.185 
 
SDOs have taken a variety of approaches to protecting standard-
names. Most prohibit or discourage the use of existing trademarks 
in standard-names unless they are used in a descriptive sense (e.g., 
Protocol for Gizmo Compatibility with Microsoft Windows®).186 
But aside from this general principle, SDOs vary significantly in the 
ways that they treat their standard-names. Many standard names are 
simply descriptive terms (e.g., ISO’s well-known ISO 9001:2015 
standard titled “Quality Management Systems – Requirements”) or 
acronyms for descriptive terms (e.g., HDMI, an acronym for High 
Definition Multimedia Interface).187 These acronyms are generally 
not registered or protected as trademarks. Some SDOs (e.g., the 
Internet Engineering Task Force) have registered trademarks in their 
organization names (e.g., IETF®), but do not protect the names of 
their standards at all.188 Other SDOs (e.g., the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)) have registered 
and maintained trademarks for their standard-names and license 
these marks for use by manufacturers of standards-compliant 
products, typically on a broad, royalty-free basis.189 
 
2. Standards and Certification 
 
Some SDOs, rather than protecting their standard-names as 
trademarks, have instead registered them as certification marks.190 
Bluetooth, for example, is a popular short-range wireless 
                                                 
185 Contreras, Trademarks, supra note 184, at x. 
186 See id. at *21-22. 
187 [cite web sites]. 
188 See Contreras, Trademarks, supra note 184, at x. 
189 See id. at *24-25. 
190 See id. at *21, Table 2. 
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connectivity standard published by the Bluetooth Special Interest 
Group and is registered as a certification mark.191  Likewise, WI-FI 
(designating the 802.11 series of wireless networking standards 
published by IEEE) is a certification mark held by the Wi-Fi 
Alliance.192 Unlike trademarks, certification marks are intended to 
identify not the source of a product, but particular characteristics of 
a product.193  
 
Many different characteristics are represented by certifications, 
including conformity to specified safety requirements, reliability 
measures, manufacturing processes, sourcing practices and 
purity/ingredient specifications. In many cases, these certifications 
provide consumers with information that would not easily be 
discernable from an outward inspection of the product.  For 
example, consumers looking for “organic” bananas or a kosher 
delicatessen are likely to rely upon certifications that particular 
bananas or delis meet these criteria, it being difficult, if not 
impossible, to verify these facts independently.194 So long as the 
certification is issued by a trusted intermediary, then consumers 
have good cause to believe that the certification signifies genuine 
compliance with the relevant standard. Certification also provides 
consumers (and retailers) with assurances regarding the safety of 
certain types of products (whether electrical equipment or raw 
vegetables). Seeing a UL certification on an electrical appliance or 
a USDA seal of approval on a package of fresh produce generally 
signifies that the product will conform to accepted minimum safety 
requirements.195 Such certifications are today a market necessity for 
many product categories, and are used by several SDOs to signify 
compliance with their standards.196 
 
3. Acts of Sui-Genericide: USB and W3C 
 
The USB Implementers Forum, Inc. (USB-IF) is a non-profit 
corporation formed in 1995 by the companies that developed the 
                                                 
191 Mark no. 
192 Mark no. 
193 See, generally, JEFFREY BELSON, CERTIFICATION AND COLLECTIVE 
MARKS (2017); Margaret Chon Certification and Collective Marks in the United 
States in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
TRADEMARK LAW (Jane Ginsburg & Irene Calboli, eds., 2019). 
194 See Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, xx 
(2009); Jeanne Fromer, The Unregulated Certification Mark(et), 69 STAN. L. 
REV. 121, xx (2017). 
195 See, generally, Fromer, supra note 194, at x. 
196 See Board-Tech Electronic Co. v. Eaton Corporation, Cooper Wiring 
Devices, Inc., 2018 WL 2901336, No. 17-3829-cv at *1 (2d Cir. Jun. 11, 2018) 
(“to be commercially viable, light switches in the United States must undergo 
certification by Underwriters Laboratories”). 
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Uniform Serial Bus (USB) standard.197 USB-IF, which today has 
over one thousand member companies, supports the advancement 
and adoption of USB technology.198 USB-IF owns several 
trademarks and certification marks relating to the Uniform Serial 
Bus (USB) standard for interconnecting and charging electronic 
devices (e.g., CERTIFIED USB199). Yet USB-IF does not hold a 
registration for the term USB itself.  While USB, as an acronym for 
a relatively well-known descriptive term (Uniform Serial Bus), 
would likely be deemed descriptive under the Abercrombie 
framework,200 it is possible that the mark USB, which has been in 
use for more than twenty years, has developed secondary meaning 
and has thus acquired distinctiveness.  As such, it is not a term 
without potential value. 
 
Nevertheless, USB-IF has publicly declared that the term 
USB is generic.  For example, in a 2008 opposition proceeding 
before the TTAB, USB-IF opposed a third party’s attempted 
registration of the mark USB-HOUSE (which lacked any disclaimer as 
to the term USB) on the ground that the term USB is generic.201 In 
the proceeding, the President and Chairman of USB-IF submitted a 
declaration stating that the term USB “is the common generic term 
used to describe a computer port that can be used to connect 
keyboards, mice, game controllers, printers, scanners, digital 
cameras, and removable media drives.”202 USB-IF also noted that 
there were more than eighty records in the USPTO’s trademark 
database containing the term USB (e.g., USB NOW, USB REALTIME, 
FLEXIUSB, etc.), all of which contained a disclaimer of the term USB 
standing alone.  USB-IF succeeded in having the registration for 
USB-HOUSE denied. 
 
Even more notable is the practice of the Worldwide Web 
Consortium (W3C).  W3C is the primary standardization body for 
the Worldwide Web and is responsible for fundamental Internet 
application layer protocols including Worldwide Web (www), 
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), and Extensible Markup 
                                                 
197 USB Implementers Forum, Inc., About USB-IF, 
https://www.usb.org/about (visited Apr. 28, 2019). 
198 USB Implementers Forum, Inc., Members, https://www.usb.org/members 
(visited Apr. 28, 2019). 
199 U.S. Trademark No. 2,592,682 (Jul. 9, 2002). 
200 Acronyms for descriptive terms are generally deemed to be descriptive 
themselves. See Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1209.03(h) (“As a 
general rule, an acronym or initialism cannot be considered descriptive unless the 
wording it stands for is merely descriptive of the goods or services, and the 
acronym or initialism is readily understood by relevant purchasers to be 
‘substantially synonymous’ with the merely descriptive wording it represents”). 
201 In re. USB-HOUSE (2008). 
202 Id. at Ex. C. 
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Language (XML).203 W3C is an unincorporated coalition of four 
educational institutions: the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), the European Research Consortium for Informatics and 
Mathematics (ECRIM), Keio University and Beihang University.204 
Its membership consists of approximately 450 institutions, private 
firms and other organizations having an interest in standards for the 
Worldwide Web.205 
 
The acronym W3C is a registered trademark in a number of 
jurisdictions.206 W3C also holds registered and unregistered 
trademarks in a number of project names including P3P (the 
Platform for Privacy Preferences Project) and the Amaya web 
browser/editor.207 Yet on its web site, W3C expressly identifies 
twenty additional terms (including the widely-deployed HTML, 
XML and HTTP standards)208 that it expressly designates as 
generic.209 W3C states that “Terms which claimed as generic are not 
governed by any W3C license and are used as common descriptors 
by the W3C.”210 
 
What do USB and W3C hope to achieve through these public 
statements that, if anything, appear to diminish their ability to 
control the use of their own marks?  The next Part examines the 




                                                 
203 [cite W3C web site info]. 
204 W3C, Facts About W3C, https://www.w3.org/Consortium/facts#org 
(visited Apr. 28, 2019). 
205 W3C, Current Members, https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List 
(visited Apr. 28, 2019) (listing 448 members). 
206 Because W3C is not an incorporated entity, its intellectual property, 
including trademarks, is held by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, its 
host institution. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, 
Standardization and the Internet, 93 DENVER L. REV. 85, xx (2016) (describing 
W3C legal structure). 
207 Worldwide Web Consortium (W3C), W3C Trademarks and Generic 
Terms, https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/2002/trademarks-20021231 
(2019) (visited Apr. 28, 2019) [hereinafter W3C Trademark Page]. 
208 Id. HTML is an acronym for “hypertext markup language”, XML is an 
acronym for “extensible markup language” and HTTP is an acronym for 
“hypertext transmission protocol”. 
209 W3C Trademark Page, supra note 207 (designating the following terms 
as generic: ACSS, CSS, DOM, DSig, HTML, HTTP, JEP, MathML, Metadata, 
PICS, PICSRules, RDF, SMIL, SVG, WebFonts, XENC, XHTML, XML, 
XMLDSIG and XSL). 
210 W3C Trademark Page, supra note 207. 
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III.    UNDERSTANDING SUI-GENERICIDE 
 
As described in Part II, sui-genericide – the voluntary 
declaration of potentially valuable terms as generic – has been 
observed in a range of contexts from common names for pesticides 
and synthetic fibers to broadly adopted technical standards.  This 
Part explores the rationales leading private firms to relinquish rights 
to these potentially valuable terms, and how sui-genericide 
compares to other mechanisms that allow the broad usage of 
common terms. 
 
A. Market Rationales for Sui-Genericide 
 
After World War II, the growth of American manufacturing 
industries led to the emergence of markets for novel products. Thus, 
unlike wool and cotton which had existed for centuries, new 
synthetic fibers like nylon and polyester were being invented and 
sold to the public. At the same time, governmental regulators like 
the FTC began to impose disclosure and labeling requirements to 
safeguard public health and safety and to inform consumers about 
the content of products they were buying.  
 
 Thus, manufacturers, regulators and consumers were united in 
their desire to find new generic terms to refer to the basic categories 
of new products entering the market. The broad recognition of these 
generic terms would accomplish three interrelated purposes for 
manufacturers: (1) giving them a common lexicon with which to 
describe the complex characteristics of their products (e.g., chemical 
composition and functional effect), (2) enabling them to build brand 
recognition and loyalty through proprietary names that would thus 
be less likely to fall to genericide challenges, and (3) preventing 
others from capturing generic terms used to describe their product 
categories. By the same token, allowing a particular manufacturer to 
capture the generic term for a product would not only harm 
competitors, but make it more difficult for regulators to convey 
important safety information to the public, and for consumers to 
understand the features of the products they were purchasing.211  
 
For example, suppose that the name NYLON were registered as a 
trademark by a particular manufacturer. Other manufacturers 
wishing to describe the fiber content of their products could not use 
the term NYLON unless they wished to refer to fiber produced by the 
owner of the mark. As a result, they would be forced to describe 
their nylon-containing products using the much more cumbersome 
                                                 
211 See Landes-Posner model, discussed in Part x, supra. 
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chemical names for the fiber, such as polyhexamethylene 
adipamide, polycaproamide or polyundecanamide.212 The use of 
these complex chemical names would not only disadvantage 
competing nylon manufacturers, but would also be less informative 
to consumers, who would be less likely to remember the 
characteristics of the fiber when identified by such a complex name. 
 
Accordingly, the government took an active hand in organizing 
early naming efforts in fields such as prescription drugs, pesticides 
and synthetic fibers. The centralized organizational frameworks and 
rule structures used to develop these names were familiar to 
scientists and technicians from a range of disciplines, as they 
resembled much older organizational structures that had been in 
place since at least the eighteenth century to assign widely-accepted 
common names to newly discovered astronomical bodies,213 
chemical elements,214 and plant and animal species.215 The 
difference, of course, between these older naming systems and 
product generic names is that a new heavenly body or species of 
bacteria will seldom have significant commercial value, whereas a 
new prescription medication or clothing fiber could have substantial 
value. Private industry thus took a leading role in developing and 
approving common names for new product categories and, as 
described in Part II, eventually took over this role entirely from the 
government. 
 
Outwardly, the designation by SDOs of certain standard-names 
as generic resembles the coordinated sui-genericide activities by 
participants in industries like pharmaceuticals and pesticides.  SDOs 
are, after all, trade associations comprising industry participants 
interested in particular technologies who coordinate to develop 
technical standards for use by all product manufacturers.  If the 
principal developers of USB technology agree to treat the term USB 
as generic, free from trademark appropriation, then the term could 
be used freely by all manufacturers of computer peripherals and 
devices implementing the USB standard. The manufacturers could 
then differentiate their own product offerings using proprietary 
brand marks (e.g., the Rosewill® USB 7-port Hub or the SanDisk 
Cruzer USB 2.0 Flash Drive). 
                                                 
212 See ISO 2076-1977 (E) at 4 (definition of nylon). 
213 Astronomical bodies are named by the International Astronomical Union. 
See Intl. Astronomical Un., Naming of Astronomical Objects, 
https://www.iau.org/public/themes/naming/. 
214 See International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, Periodic Table of 
Elements, https://iupac.org/what-we-do/periodic-table-of-elements/#a4 (visited 
Apr. 29, 2019). 
215 See, e.g., MICHAEL OHL, THE ART OF NAMING (English trans. Elisabeth 
Lauffer, 2018). 
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In fact, the case for sui-genericide of technical standard-names 
may be even more clear than it is in other markets.  While SDOs 
create and publish standards that are embodied in a wide range of 
products – smartphones, cars, telecommunications satellites – SDOs 
neither manufacture these products nor any components included in 
them.  Instead, they publish documents laying out the protocols 
necessary to make these products interoperate with one another. 
Thus, ETSI has published numerous versions of the fourth 
generation (4G) long term evolution (LTE) standard for wideband 
wireless communication, and holds trademark registrations for LTE 
in various countries. However, ETSI itself does not manufacture or 
sell LTE-compliant products.  Smartphones that can connect to the 
LTE network are manufactured by firms like Apple, Samsung, and 
many others, each of which is licensed by ETSI to utilize the LTE 
mark on its LTE-compliant products. And the microchips that 
enable LTE functionality in these smartphones are sold by vendors 
like Qualcomm. So if a trademark is intended to indicate source, 
what source is being indicated by Samsung’s use of the LTE mark 
to indicate that its smartphones contain Qualcomm chips that 
contain LTE technology?  Certainly, use of the LTE mark says 
nothing about the source or quality of the smartphone, except that it 
presumably conforms to ETSI’s LTE standard.216 Thus, the value of 
trademarks on standard-names is questionable. 
 
B. Doctrinal Effects of Genericide  
 
If a term is generic, it describes a product characteristic without 
indicating its source.  A zipper, an escalator, a cellophane wrapper 
– all of these products and product features may be described by 
anyone making a product with the relevant characteristics.  So, just 
as an apparel maker may claim that “This travel vest has five 
zippered pockets”, a product manufacturer may claim “This laptop 
offers four USB ports”.  To make this claim, the statement should 
be true, but the manufacturer need not obtain the permission of the 
owner of a particular mark or pass any particular certification test. 
                                                 
216 Ultimately, the reason that SDOs register standard-names as trademarks 
may trace its roots to the standards documents themselves. In many respects, 
SDOs act like publishers: they sell (or sometimes make freely available) copies 
of their standards.  And, like publishers of books, music and other copyrighted 
content, piracy of standards documents is a real concern for many SDOs (see 
Contreras, Trademarks, supra note x, at *16-17, 21 (discussing piracy and 
protection of copyrighted standards). Thus, SDOs that anticipate the need to assert 
rights against unauthorized publishers of their standards may find the registration 
of trademarks to be helpful in enforcing such rights. 
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The manufacturer may simply assert, on a factual basis, that the 
relevant feature is offered.217 
 
The genericness of a term also precludes others from registering 
it as a mark, and poses obstacles to registering it as part of a mark 
without disclaiming the generic term. Thus, as discussed above,218 
USB-IF successfully challenged an applicant’s application for the 
mark USB-HOUSE when the term USB itself was not disclaimed. But 
this result required both that USB-IF monitor and become aware of 
the threatened registration, and that it then intervene at the TTAB, 
neither of which is cost-free. Yet even this option does not prevent 
the use of the generic term in marks, it only prevents the registrant 
from claiming rights in the generic term used independently. Thus, 
as USB-IF noted in the USB-HOUSE dispute, there are more than 80 
registered marks that incorporate the generic term USB.219 
 
These results suggest that generic terms can be incorporated 
more freely than trademarks into combination marks, either with or 
without disclaimers.  The diversity of names and terms that emerge 
can be viewed as a positive effect: an opening, as it were, in an 
otherwise narrowing trademark universe; a growth of the trademark 
commons. This proliferation of marks might not be possible save for 
the genericness of the underlying mark. And the desire for private 
actors such as W3C and USB-IF to open the market to broader uses 
of these otherwise protectable terms can be analogized to similar 
gestures toward the public domain made by firms with respect to 
patentable technologies and copyrighted works.220 
 
These principles are consistent with the economic model 
developed by Landes and Posner. In order to maximize consumer 
surplus, generic terms must remain available to all competitors to 
describe general categories of goods and services, which can then 
be differentiated on the basis of individual firm branding. But the 
classification of terms as generic, and thus beyond the scope of 
trademark protection, cannot be unbounded.  As Landes and Posner 
show, trademarks themselves provide value to consumers in terms 
of reduced search costs. Thus, maximizing consumer surplus 
involves both the recognition of non-generic terms as trademarks, 
and the availability of generic terms to describe general categories 
of goods and services.  
                                                 
217 The same result obtains under a nominative fair use analysis, but the use 
of a generic term avoids the necessity to contend with the still-unclear standards 
for nominative fair use in the U.S. 
218 See notes x, supra, and accompanying text. 
219 List examples 
220 See notes x, supra, and accompanying text. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043 




Thus, to the party that wishes to expand the universe of terms 
that may be used in commerce, a determination that a mark is 
generic offers advantages over simply declining to register a mark 
in the first place.  Non-registration leaves the potentially generic 
term open to registration and enforcement by others, a risky 
proposition.  The finding that a mark is generic, on the other hand, 
has erga omnes effect – one that impacts all possible registrants and 
users of the mark. As such, like defensive publication in the patent 
realm,221 genericide does more than eliminate the first user’s ability 
to exploit a term.  It returns the term to the public. 
 
C. Certification versus Genericide 
 
But what about certification marks? As discussed in Part x 
above, the owner of a certification mark may specify relevant 
quality or functionality features of a product (e.g., organic, kosher), 
so that that the manufacturer of any compliant product may 
designate its product using the mark.  Use of a certification mark 
thus informs consumers that the marked product conforms with the 
relevant certification standards, and also allows different 
manufacturers to compete on the basis of price, size and other 
product features (e.g., Chiquita versus Dole organic bananas). An 
additional benefit to consumers is that the owner of the certification 
mark must make some effort to police the use of its certification 
mark, thus establishing at least some baseline for reliance on the 
mark. 
 
But are the same guarantees regarding product characteristics 
and safety required for the types of products that have been subject 
to sui-genericide declarations? As discussed in Part II, the 
manufacture and marketing of pharmaceuticals, pesticides and 
synthetic fibers are all regulated by governmental agencies. This 
regulation, coupled with a range of private remedies for false 
advertising, misrepresentation and consumer fraud, may give 
consumers the assurances that they need regarding the accuracy of 
product labeling, and thus reducing the need for separate 
certification through trademark law. For example, suppose that a 
firm marketed a product labeled as containing ibuprofen, but its 
active ingredient did not conform to the WHO’s INN definition of 
ibuprofen.  This act – whether arising from negligence or deception 
-- would subject the firm to a barrage of liability claims, from FDA 
enforcement actions to consumer and competitor lawsuits for false 
advertising to tort claims for any resulting injuries or health effects.  
                                                 
221 See note x, supra. 
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It is unlikely that a certification mark for IBUPROFEN, whether held 
by a trade association or another private firm, would appreciably 
increase the incentives to label a product accurately as containing 
ibuprofen. 
 
The need for certification appears equally uncertain in the area 
of technical standards. Certainly, compliance with key 
interoperability standards is an important feature of many products. 
When a computer is advertised as including Bluetooth capability, a 
consumer is justified in relying on that representation in making a 
purchasing decision. In this sense, one might argue that having an 
independent certification that a laptop incorporates Bluetooth 
technology is useful to consumers. Yet a laptop computer embodies 
hundreds of standards222 and thousands of features and 
functionalities in addition to interoperability standards.  If these 
features do not work as promised, it is not difficult to construct a 
theory under which the consumer should be entitled to recover (e.g., 
breach of implied warranty, false advertising, etc.). Moreover, every 
consumer need not test a product’s features for himself or herself.  
Once a product is found not to conform to its advertised features, 
online reviews, retailer pressure, consumer protection regulators and 
consumer litigation may all combine to push manufacturers to label 
product features accurately. In these cases, independent certification 
also adds little to manufacturer incentives to advertise product 
features accurately. 
 
Thus, certification and certification marks may not be all that 
necessary in product categories that are either heavily regulated or 
in which the presence or absence of a product’s advertised features 
is discernable by consumers or consumer protection groups.  
Whether the product is ibuprofen or nylon or a USB device, the user 
of the term has a duty to represent its product fairly and accurately.  
If it does not, then a range of regulatory and tort remedies are 
available. 
 
 And another implicit function of certification marks – 
precluding a third party from obtaining trademark protection on the 
same mark – can more easily and cost-effectively be achieved 
through sui-genericide. That is, a declaration of sui-genericide does 
not require the operation of a certification program or even the 
registration and maintenance of certification marks. Sui-genericide 
may thus function like a poor man’s certification. It enables the 
                                                 
222 See Brad Biddle, Andrew White & Sean Woods, How Many Standards in 
a Laptop? (And Other Empirical Questions), 2010 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION SEC. 
TELECOMM. STANDARDIZATION, KALEIDOSCOPE ACAD. CONF. PROC. at 3 (finding 
251 standards embodied in an out-of-the-box laptop computer). 
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name of a common product feature or characteristic to be used 
broadly within the marketplace, without the cost or legal overhead 
of certification. 
 
D. Sui-Genericide versus Nominative Fair Use 
 
Under the nominative fair use doctrine, as it has developed in 
the U.S. and elsewhere, a third party may use and display another’s 
trademark in a manner that is non-deceptive and that does not imply 
endorsement by the mark owner when referring to the products or 
services of the mark owner.223 Thus, an automotive repair shop may 
use the trademarked word VOLKSWAGEN to advertise that it repairs 
Volkswagen automobiles, so long as it does not imply that it has 
been endorsed by Volkswagen and uses only so much of the mark 
as is necessary to convey the relevant information.224 
 
One could thus argue that sui-genericide is not necessary, as the 
broad use of terms like ibuprofen and USB on products with relevant 
features, even if these terms were owned as trademarks, could be 
permitted as nominative fair use. But one must then pose the 
converse question: why expend the resources required to register 
and maintain a trademark when its primary purpose will be to be 
used on products manufactured by others under the nominative fair 
use doctrine. Sui-genericide offers an inexpensive and effective 
means to achieve a result similar to that achieved through trademark 
protection coupled with nominative fair use. 
 
 
IV.  LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR SUI-GENERICIDE 
 
If benefits can flow from recognition of marks as generic, then 
it is worth considering whether and how the practice of sui-
genericide could be formalized and made available to parties that 
would like to avail themselves of it. This Part first assesses the legal 
effect of sui-genericide statements, and then assesses potential legal 
frameworks that could enhance the enforceability of these 
commitments. 
 
                                                 
223 See J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2008); William McGeveran, Rethinking 
Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008). 
224 See Volkswagen v. Church (9th Cir. 1969) (“[In] advertising the repair of 
Volkswagens, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid altogether the use 
of the word Volkswagen or its abbreviation ‘VW’, which are the normal terms 
which, to the public at large, signify [the mark owner’s] cars.”) 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043 
CONTRERAS – SUI-GENERICIDE 
48 
 
A. Legal Effect of Unilateral Declarations 
 
As discussed in Part I, a mark will be deemed generic if it has 
come to describe a general class of goods or services: an escalator, 
a trampoline, a zipper.  In each of the many genericide cases on the 
books, either the PTO or a challenger presented evidence to 
demonstrate that the challenged mark was, indeed, generic.  But in 
each of these cases the applicant or registrant sought to rebut this 
evidence, and in some cases did so successfully, thereby fending off 
the charge of genericism.225 A question that does not appear to have 
arisen yet is the legal effect of a party’s own admission of 
genericism.  In each of the sui-genericide examples described in this 
article, the declarant’s conclusory statement is not accompanied by 
consumer surveys, bibliometric analyses or dictionary definitions. It 
is, rather, a unilateral statement of a legal conclusion by a party (or 
a group) that is, at a minimum, interested in the outcome.  To what 
degree can, or should, we trust an entity that unilaterally claims that 
a term is generic? 
 
Absent a formal abandonment mechanism, such as exists under 
copyright and patent law, unilateral declarations are given little 
weight by the law. Certainly, few would give credence to PepsiCo’s 
unsubstantiated and self-serving declaration that COKE is a generic 
term for a cola beverage. Why should we give greater weight to such 
a statement if it is made by The Coca Cola Company?  That is, can 
a firm simply declare, without producing relevant evidence, that its 
own mark has become generic, without the question being 
adjudicated by a competent finder of fact or law?   
 
Pulling this thread further, could such a declaration be used 
against others who later sought to register a mark similar to, or 
incorporating, the self-declared generic term? That is, even if a 
firm’s unilateral declaration regarding the generic nature of a term 
could impact that firm’s ability to register or enforce such a term as 
a mark, could such a declaration have preclusive effect against 
others? The answer to most of these questions today, it seems, is no.   
 
B. Non-Recognition of Sui-Genericide in Trademark 
Proceedings 
 
Likewise, the USPTO has never recognized the legal effect of a 
proposed trademark’s inclusion on a list of generic names, whether 
published by WHO, USAN, ISO or even the FTC.  As noted in Part 
x, above, the USPTO Manual of Trademark Examining Procedure 
                                                 
225 See, e.g., Google, Comic.con 
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(TMEP) makes no mention of USAN or the WHO INN program, 
nor does it instruct trademark examiners to consider whether the 
inclusion of a proposed trademark on such a list of common names 
should give rise to any presumption of genericness. 
 
In the single Trademark Trials and Appeal Board (TTAB) case 
mentioning USAN International Drug Names,226 Smithkline 
Beecham opposed a Danish firm’s U.S. application to register the 
mark TOPOTECT for a human and veterinary cancer treatment.227 It 
argued that the term TOPOTECT was only “a slight misspelling, 
abbreviation, or variation of the generic  term ‘topotecan’,” which is 
listed by USAN (in the form topotecan hydrochloride) as a generic 
term for a topoisomerase inhibitor chemotherapy drug.228 
Smithkline Beecham emphasized that “both the World Health 
Organization and USAN strongly discourage the use of USAN and 
INN generic terms as trademarks.”229 While the TTAB 
acknowledged that topotecan is a generic term for a pharmaceutical 
chemotherapy agent, it did not find that the proposed mark 
TOPOTECT would be perceived by the public as a misspelling or 
abbreviation of topotecan.230 Thus, while the challenged mark was 
not found to be generic in this case, it at least offers some indication 
that the USPTO may take cognizance of the designation of a term as 
a generic or common name on a recognized registry or list, even if 
only as one piece of evidence supporting a claim for genericide. 
 
What’s more, the fact that the TOPOTECT case, a nonprecedential 
TTAB decision, is the only U.S. trademark case in which an 
applicant sought to register a USAN common drug name or a variant 
thereof suggests that industry norms surrounding the registration of 
common drug names is quite strong. In other words, if industry 
participants did not view USAN common names as off-limits for 
trademark protection, then one might expect a greater number of 
attempts to register these names as trademarks and a concomitant 
number of TTAB and judicial challenges to those registrations.  The 
                                                 
226 Searches for “World Health Organization” and “USAN” on LEXIS “All 
Trademark Law Cases” and “All Trademark Law Administrative Materials” 
conducted on Apr. 28, 2019 resulted in only one case that mentioned a USAN 
common name in connection with a genericism challenge to a trademark. The 
WHO INN program was not mentioned at all. 
227 Smithkline Beecham PLC v. TopoTarget ApS Corp., 2004 TTAB LEXIS 
504 (Sept. 2, 2004) (nonprecedential). 
228 Id. at *10-*12.  As noted by the TTAB, a “misspelling or variation in a 
few letters is far too little to turn a generic term into a protectable trademark”. Id. 
at *12 (citing, inter alia, In re Organik Technologies Inc., 41 USPQ2d 1690 
(TTAB 1997) (ORGANIK phonetic equivalent to misdescriptive  term 
"organic")). 
229 Id. at *14. 
230 Id. at *23-24. 
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relative quiet in this small corner of an otherwise litigious industry 
suggests that declarations of sui-genericide, at least in the 
pharmaceutical industry, are respected by the players in that 
industry. 
 
C. Reliance and Estoppel 
 
In several of the examples of sui-genericide discussed in this 
article, the initial proposal for a generic or common name must be 
submitted in writing, often on a standardized application form. For 
example, as discussed in Part II.C, the application form for common 
pesticide names required the applicant to commit not to claim 
trademark rights in the proposed common name and to obtain a 
commitment from any relevant trademark holders that the name 
would be made available “for unrestricted use.”231  
 
While such a unilateral statement would probably not be 
considered a binding contractual commitment, it could have legal 
effect under the doctrine of promissory estoppel if others reasonably 
relied on it.232 Thus, if other members of the relevant naming 
committee relied on the applicant’s representation that a proposed 
common name was not, and would not be, subject to a trademark 
application when they approved the term as a common name, then 
the applicant might later be estopped from asserting that trademark 
against others or from arguing that the name was not generic.233 
 
For example, although the U.S. firms that submitted terms to the 
Bureau of Foreign Commerce Generic Word Program did not 
themselves make any express representation or commitment 
regarding the generic nature of those terms, the Bureau required 
some degree of evidence that the terms were “regarded as generic 
by the United States industry for the particular types of products on 
which they are used.”234 Because it is plausible to assume that this 
evidence could also have been used to oppose a U.S. registration of 
                                                 
231 See note 155, supra, and accompanying text. 
232 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) (“[a] promise 
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on 
the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or 
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.”) 
233 A similar theory has been proposed in connection with the enforcement of 
unilateral commitments to license patents that are essential to technical standards 
on terms that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). See 
Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note x, at 541-46 (arguing that the makers of 
such commitments should be legally bound by them under a novel “market 
reliance” theory, notwithstanding the difficulty of proving actual reliance by 
market participants). 
234 Travaglini & Lightman, supra note 101, at 743. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043 
CONTRERAS – SUI-GENERICIDE 
51 
 
the submitted terms, one can also assume that the firms seeking to 
prevent the foreign registration of the term effectively conceded the 
genericness of the term in the United States. That is, the American 
auto manufacturers who submitted the term DIESEL to the Bureau 
could not realistically have expected to obtain a registration of the 
term DIESEL. Thus their submission of terms to the Generic Word 
Program had the practical effect of an admission of genericness or, 
in the alternative, a commitment not to seek registration of the 
submitted terms. 
 
While such arguments might prevail against the applicant for a 
particular common or generic name, it is less clear that a promissory 
estoppel theory would prevent non-applicants from using a common 
name as a trademark. In considering this question, it is worth 
analyzing separately other members of the relevant naming 
committee and uninvolved third parties.   
 
Each of the examples of sui-genericide discussed in this article 
involves the collective action, or at least acquiescence, of a group of 
interested parties. Thus, with regard to the Generic Word Program, 
suggestions for generic words were made to the Bureau by the 
USTA, which received these suggestions from its member 
companies. Proposals for generic or common names for 
pharmaceuticals, pesticides and synthetic fibers, are made by 
individual firms, but are then evaluated and published by 
committees consisting of members from multiple industry 
participants, government and academia (WHO and the USAN 
Council for pharmaceuticals, ISO/TC 81 for pesticides and ISO/TC 
38 for synthetic fibers). Likewise, statements of sui-genericide for 
technical standards have been made by SDOs (USB-IF and W3C), 
which are, in effect, trade associations consisting of hundreds of 
industry participants.   
 
It is possible that by participating in such a group (whether a 
group dedicated to developing common names such as ISO/TC 81 
or an SDO responsible for all aspects of a standard such as USB or 
HTML), members of the group could be argued to have committed 
themselves not to register any name designated as generic by the 
group.  While this commitment may be weaker than that of the 
original applicant for a particular generic name, such an agreement 
could be implied from group membership through a promissory 
estoppel theory.235 
                                                 
235 Such an argument has also been made in the context of FRAND patent 
licensing commitments made within SDOs that do not have formal contractual 
arrangements among their members.  See Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note 
x, at 496-97 (discussing “voluntary SDO declarations” at SDOs such as IETF). 
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Even more difficult, however, is the case of non-participants in 
the naming group. These parties have no explicit or implicit 
commitment to avoid the registration of a common name as a 
trademark.236 Thus, in the TTAB matter involving the mark 
TOPOTECT, the applicant, a Danish company, did not participate in 
the USAN naming process. Smithkline Beecham, however, which 
marketed a topotecan hydrochloride product under the brand name 
Hycamtin, clearly avoided use of the topotecan generic name in its 
brand name. 
 
For all of these reasons, the treatment of common names as 
generic on an erga omnes basis would result in a significantly more 
robust exclusion of such names as trademarks. One way to achieve 
this effect is through cancelation of the relevant mark. 
 
D. Cancelation Proceedings 
 
As discussed in Part I.B, above, a registered mark may be 
challenged on the basis of genericism in a cancelation proceeding 
by “a person who believes that he is or will be damaged” by such 
registration.237 In order to establish standing to bring a cancelation 
proceeding, such a person must allege a “direct and personal stake” 
in the outcome of the proceeding,238 and while actual damage need 
not be proved to establish standing, the person’s belief that he or she 
has been damaged must be more than subjective.239 In addition, a 
registered mark that its owner seeks to enforce may be challenged 
as generic by an alleged infringer as an affirmative defense to the 
claim of infringement.240 But none of these administrative or 
litigation genericism challenges to registered marks can be initiated 
by a mark owner or other interested party. Such cancelations 
currently require action by a third party – either through direct 
                                                 
Membership in a group that collectively commits to treat designated names as 
generic could also be analogized to a “coordinated pledge” made with respect to 
patents.  See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 10, at 564-69. 
236 In the case of SDO FRAND commitments, such non-participating parties 
have been referred to as “outsiders” – market actors that do not participate in 
SDOs and are thus not bound by the FRAND and other commitments made by 
SDO participants. See Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards 
Outsiders and Unencumbered Patents, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 507, xx 
(2016). 
237 15 U.S.C. § 1064. 
238 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., 111 USPQ2d 1058, 
1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023, 
1026 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
239 Ritchie, 50 USPQ2d at 1027. See also TTABMP §§ 303.03-04 (June 
2018). 
240 See notes x, supra. 
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opposition to the mark or an infringement in which it counterclaims 
by challenging the mark as generic. Moreover, even under these 
circumstances, litigation is costly and requires active and 
determined parties, which might not always be available.   
 
This is the reason that groups like the Proprietary Association 
began more than a half century ago to oppose foreign trademarks 
and applications for what they perceived to be generic terms 
important to U.S. business.241 The need for intervention also gave 
rise to the Bureau of Foreign Commerce Generic Word Program.242 
Though the Bureau did not itself initiate proceedings to oppose or 
cancel foreign trademarks or applications, it did provide an expert, 
central clearinghouse for petitioning foreign governments to deny 
trademark protection for words believed by U.S. companies to be 
generic. And while both of these efforts focused on foreign 
trademark filings, the FTC’s cancelation action against the U.S. 
trademark FORMICA arose from similar considerations.243 In all of 
these cases, actions to cancel registrations for generic marks were 
made at the request or suggestion of private sector actors operating 
in the relevant industry. 
 
For a variety of reasons, most likely involving cost and changing 
government priorities,244 each of these governmentally-sponsored 
genericide programs had been discontinued by the 1980s.  Thus, 
unless governmental priorities and resources are re-aligned to 
support a broad program of genericide challenges to U.S. marks, 
direct cancelation proceedings are unlikely to re-emerge as a 
significant avenue for eliminating generic marks. The focus thus 
returns to mechanisms for strengthening the legal enforceability of 
sui-genericide declarations. 
 
E. Toward Greater Legal Recognition of Sui-Genericide 
 
As noted above, there is currently no reliable way under U.S. 
law to ensure that commonly-agreed generic terms are not registered 
as trademarks.  This Part offers some modest proposals intended to 
enhance the legal effect of declarations of sui-genericide. 
 
                                                 
241 See Part II.A, supra. 
242 See id. 
243 See note 63, supra. 
244 See Part II.E, supra, discussing U.S. government disengagement from 
private standardization efforts. 
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1. Consensus Lists in Trademark Examination 
 
Though the lists of common names developed by the WHO’s 
INN program, the USAN Council, and ISO committees addressing 
pesticides and synthetic fibers do not themselves have legal effect, 
they demonstrate that industry-led coalitions can develop consensus 
lists of common names for new products that are of concern to them.  
One way to lend greater legal effect force to these lists (which I term 
“Consensus Lists”) would be to enact federal legislation or 
regulation officially recognizing Consensus Lists for purposes of 
trademark examination and challenge.  That is, trademark examiners 
could be directed, to inspect Consensus Lists during the examination 
process to ascertain whether trademark applications contain terms 
that have been determined by relevant industry groups to be generic.  
This relatively modest step in the trademark examination procedure 
would shift much of the burden of identifying applications for 
generic terms from competitors and other interested observers (e.g., 
the private firms who petitioned the USTA to approach the 
Department of Commerce during the Generic Word Program) to the 
examination process, where it could arguably be accomplished more 
efficiently and comprehensively. The examiner’s consultation of 
Consensus Lists during examination could also screen out 
trademarks on commonly accepted generic terms prior to 
registration, thus avoiding the need for more costly opposition and 
cancelation proceedings after trademarks have been issued. 
 
In order to elicit the greatest amount of relevant evidence during 
examination, it would also be useful for the examiner to notify the 
relevant naming body when he or she identifies a potential mark that 
is identical or confusingly similar to a common name included in a 
Consensus List. This notice would make the naming body aware of 
the potential trademark and enable it to produce evidence regarding 
the duration and extent of generic use of the name in the industry. 
 
2. A Presumption of Genericism 
 
A requirement that the generic names included in Consensus 
Lists be considered during the trademark examination process 
would ensure that these generic names are not overlooked by the 
trademark examiner. However, the work of consensus-based 
naming groups could be given even greater legal weight if a legal 
presumption were created, either through federal statute or judicial 
action, that the names included in such Consensus Lists be accorded 
a rebuttable presumption of genericism for all purposes, including 
in litigation. That is, if a common name is included in a Consensus 
List it would be presumed to be generic, and an application that 
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sought to register that common name (or a term confusingly similar 
to a common name) would be deemed ineligible for registration 
unless the applicant presented convincing evidence that the 
requested mark was distinctive.245 This requirement would serve to 
flush out, at an early stage, any evidence held by the applicant that 
its proposed mark is not generic. 
 
Such a presumption of genericness need not be limited to the 
trademark examination stage. It could also provide benefits in 
trademark oppositions and cancelation proceedings. That is, just as 
in an examination, a common name appearing in a Consensus List 
would be presumptively generic for purposes of challenging a 
trademark that was identical or confusingly similar to the common 
name. As a result, such trademarks would be susceptible to 
cancelation unless the registrant could produce convincing evidence 
that the term is distinctive as to source and not generic. 
 
An alternative approach might defer the presumption until some 
time period (e.g., five years) has elapsed during which the common 
term has remained on the list without challenge (e.g., by the owner 
of a mark issued before the designation of the mark as a common 
term). This waiting period would be similar to the period that 
descriptive marks must wait to acquire distinctiveness before 
becoming registrable on the Principal Register.246 The value of such 
a waiting period would be to ensure the stability of the entries on the 
Consensus List that are accorded a presumption of genericness, 
particularly if there is a public comment or challenge period after 
entries first appear on the list. 
 
The creation of a presumption of genericness would give 
substantial weight to the sui-genericide declarations made via 
Consensus Lists.  In many ways, this weighing of the scales seems 
fair, given both the overall efficiencies to be achieved by preventing 
the capture of generic terms as trademarks, and the persuasive 
weight of an industry consensus regarding the terminology of the 
relevant field.  
 
3. Due Process in the Development of Consensus Lists 
 
Naturally, if Consensus Lists are to be accorded significant legal 
deference, as proposed in the preceding discussion, then it is 
                                                 
245 See, e.g., Smithkline Beecham PLC v. TopoTarget ApS Corp., 2004 
TTAB LEXIS 504 (Sept. 2, 2004) (nonprecedential) (considering whether the 
proposed mark TOPOTECT was only “a slight misspelling, abbreviation, or 
variation of the generic  term ‘topotecan’”).  
246 Lanham Act §§ 23-28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1096. 
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particularly important to ensure that the development of such 
Consensus Lists is conducted in a manner that will be deemed to be 
representative of the relevant industry and not organized to 
advantage particular competitors or commercial interests.247 Thus, 
even if significant deference is given to the determinations of 
consensus-based naming bodies, this deference must be tempered 
with due regard to potential anticompetitive conduct by such groups. 
 
In order to assure a suitable level of representativeness among 
the developers of Consensus Lists, it would not be unreasonable to 
require that consensus-developing groups, and their procedures, 
comply with certain minimum “due process” procedures and 
requirements in order to be recognized.  Such due process 
requirements are already imposed on SDOs in many contexts, and 
include requirements that such organizations operate on an open, 
balanced and transparent basis, that standards are developed based 
on consensus-based processes, and that mechanisms exist for 
participants to appeal or contest particular decisions.248 Likewise, 
such due process mechanisms are required of any SDO that wishes 
to be accredited by the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) as a developer of American National Standards.249 The 
review of such groups and procedures could be conducted by a 
governmental agency such as the USPTO or the National Institute 
for Standards and Technology (NIST), or an impartial non-
governmental agency such as ANSI. 
 
At the outset, official recognition of Consensus Lists could be 
conferred selectively on lists of names developed by well-
established naming groups such as those discussed in this article 
(e.g., USAN Council (pharmaceuticals), ISO/TC 81 (pesticides) and 
                                                 
247 Unfortunately, industry groups have been known throughout history to 
engage in coercive and collusive practices designed not to further the best interests 
of the industry, but to advantage particular competitors or groups of competitors. 
See, e.g., George S. Cary & Daniel P. Culley, Concerted Action in Standard-
Setting in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: 
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, 78 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2018) 
(describing cases of anticompetitive collusion in standard-setting). 
248 These “due process” characteristics are generally required in order for 
SDOs and their standards to be recognized by certain governmental bodies and 
are viewed as prudent, if not mandatory, to operate in compliance with applicable 
antitrust and competition laws. See Justus Baron et al., Making the Rules: The 
Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on 
Intellectual Property Rights, JRC Science for Policy Report EUR 29655 at x 
(Mar. 2019). 
249 AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE 
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS § 3.1.1, 10–11 
(2019) [hereinafter ANSI Essential Requirements] (an SDO must conform to the 
ANSI Essential Requirements in order to be recognized as a developer of 
American National Standards). 
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ISO/TC 38 (textiles)) as well as recognized SDOs such as USB-IF 
and W3C. Later, a procedure could be established whereby 
additional groups could apply for such recognition after 
demonstrating their representation of a significant industry sector 
and their compliance with the due process requirements described 
above. 
 
Another question relevant to this proposal is whether 
declarations of sui-genericide should be accepted not only from 
representative industry bodies, but also from individual firms or 
persons. For example, could Adobe unilaterally declare, with the 
same legal effect as an international naming body, that its mark PDF 
is generic? Many of the same justifications for allowing collective 
declarations exist with respect to such unilateral declarations.  
However, one could argue that the law should give less weight to 
unilateral declarations than to declarations that represent a 
consensus view of a particular industry. That is, while a unilateral 
declaration may represent the view of one particular company, other 
companies in the industry may disagree (perhaps vehemently) with 
the declaring company’s assessment of a term as generic (consider 
the Pepsi-Coke hypothetical posed in Part IV.A above). With a 
Consensus List, so long as the naming body is sufficiently 
representative of the relevant industry, there is a greater likelihood 
that the terms selected as generic would have more general 
acceptance and less opposition from competitors. 
 
4. Implementation: Legislation versus Regulation 
 
The proposals outlined in this article with respect to the 
consideration and recognition of Consensus Lists could be 
implemented in several ways.  First, and most directly, Congress 
could amend the Lanham Act to impose such requirements on the 
USPTO and to create a legal presumption of genericness associated 
with names included on Consensus Lists.  However, Congressional 
action – always difficult and complex to achieve -- is not necessarily 
required to effectuate many of the components of this proposal.   
 
With regard to the consideration of generic names included in 
Consensus Lists during trademark examination, the USPTO could 
implement such a requirement through amendments to the Rules of 
Practice in Trademark Cases,250 codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) and modified frequently through agency notice 
and comment rulemaking.251 It is also possible that at least a 
                                                 
250 37 C.F.R. Part 2- Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases. 
251 See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Rule Making: Trademark Federal 
Register Notices and Comments, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/laws-
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requirement that trademark examiners consult Consensus Lists 
during trademark examination could be effected through a simple  
amendment to the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure,252 a 
comprehensive guidance document for trademark examiners, 
applicants and attorneys that is updated frequently.253 While an 
amendment to the TMEP could not create a general presumption of 
genericness arising from declarations of sui-genericide, it would be 
a relatively painless first step that could, at a minimum, serve to 
direct examiner attention to such declarations – a significant 
improvement over current practice. 
  
 
5. International Harmonization 
 
As indicated by continuing efforts of the USTR in the area of 
foreign registration of generic and common names,254 there is little 
international harmonization of the treatment of generic and common 
names.255  Yet the development of common names in an increasing 
array of product categories is international in nature.256 It would thus 
be worthwhile for the USTR and USPTO to urge their foreign 
counterparts, through existing international cooperative channels, to 
consider the adoption of the examination and presumption proposals 
discussed in Subparts 1 and 2 above with respect to Consensus Lists 
of common names. 
 
The recognition of consensus-based common names as 
ineligible for trademark registration is not unknown internationally, 
and in fact many foreign trademark offices give greater deference to 
such common names than the USPTO.  For example, The EU 
Intellectual Property Office treats as non-registrable “trade marks 
which consist of, or reproduce in their essential elements, an earlier 
plant variety denomination registered in accordance with Union 
                                                 
regulations/rule-making-trademark-federal-register-notices-and-comments 
(accessed May 19, 2019). 
252 TMEP, supra note 52. 
253 See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Trademark Manual of Examining 
Procedure – Files and Archives,  https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/guides-and-
manuals/tmep-archives (accessed May 19, 2019) (TMEP updated 17 times since 
2010). 
254 See Part II.E, supra. 
255 For a discussion of the need for greater international harmonization in the 
recognition of foreign language generic terms, see Brauneis & Moerland, supra 
note 107. 
256 E.g., the WHO INN program for pharmaceutical common names (see Part 
II.B, supra), ISO/TC 38 for textile fibers (see Part II.D, supra), ISO/TC 81 for 
pesticides (see Part II.C, supra), the Codex Alimentarius Commission for 
foodstuffs (see note 178, supra), and a range of technology-focused SDOs 
including W3C, ETSI, IEEE-SA and others. 
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legislation or national law, or international agreements to which the 
Union or the Member State concerned is a party, providing for 
protection of plant variety rights, and which are in respect of plant 
varieties of the same or closely related species.”257 Likewise, law 
and regulation in numerous countries prohibit the registration of 
WHO-recognized INNs and other common names as trademarks.258 
Accordingly, international harmonization of the proposed measures 





Unlike patent and copyright law, which offer mechanisms by 
which inventions and works of authorship may be dedicated to the 
public domain, trademark law offers no explicit mechanism by 
which parties may place a particular word, term or device into the 
public domain. Yet for more than half a century, private parties have 
voluntarily been designating words and terms as generic – the 
practice of sui-genericide. This practice yields several potential 
benefits to the market, including the creation of common terms by 
which all participants in a market can refer to their products while 
using proprietary brands to differentiate themselves and compete 
with one another. The designation of these common terms as generic 
may also have the benefit of preventing others from registering such 
terms as trademarks, but current legal theories, including promissory 
estoppel, do not unequivocally render such terms generic for all 
purposes. Accordingly, this article proposes several measures that 
could be implemented either through federal legislation or judicial 
action to enhance the legal recognition of declarations of sui-
genericide.  These include official recognition and consideration 
during trademark prosecution of “consensus” lists of common terms 
that are developed by broadly-representative industry groups and the 
creation of a presumption of genericness for terms that appear on 
such lists. Coupled with international harmonization of the 
treatment of sui-genericide, such measures could reduce consumer 
search costs, enhance competition among producers of standardized 
                                                 
257 Eur. Union Trademark Reg., 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(m) (Absolute Grounds 
for Refusal). See also Eur. Union Intell. Prop. Off., Guidelines For Examination 
Of European Union Trade Marks, Part B – Examination, Section 4 - Absolute 
Grounds For Refusal, Chapter 13 - Trade Marks In Conflict With Earlier Plant 
Variety Denominations (Jan. 10, 2017). 
258 See, e.g., Indian Trademark Act of 1999, Sec. 13; Andean Community, 
Decision 486/2000 (Establishing the Common Intellectual Property Regime), 
Article 135(f) (“Those signs may not be registered as marks that: … (f) consist 
solely of a sign or statement which is the generic or technical name of the product 
or service concerned”). 
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products, and bring increased efficiency to markets that depend on 
the unencumbered availability of common names. 
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